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I. BACKGROUND

Article 17 of the Geneva Convention of 1949,

Relative To Th,e Treatment Of Prisoners Of War stated that,
"No physical violence or mental torture, nor any other
form of coercion may be inflicted on prisoners of war to
secure from them information of any kind whatsoever.
Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threat

ened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous
1

treatment of any kind."

There were three countries

that did not sign the document: the United States, North
p

Korea, and China.

The Korean War

On July 1, 1950, a C-54 landed in the Republic of
Korea carrying the first contingent of American troops.
This.was in response to the North Korean invasion of South

Korea on June 25, of that year.

The troops went directly

from a peacetime setting to war, without any political

1

Eugene Kinkead, In Every War But One (Westport:
Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1959), p. 111.

^Ibid, p. 118.

justification for their involvement.

The fighting during the next two months was heavy,
with virtually no POWs taken by the North Korean People's
Army (NKPA).

They treated captured American soldiers

inhumanely, resorting to torture and murder.

It was

common to find captured servicemen with their hands bound

behind their backs with a bullet through their heads.^
During this time. General Douglas MacArthur, the Commander
In Chief Of United Nations Forces, Korea, was asked to
hold off the NKPA until units could be activated for action

in Korea.

After much fighting with little success, the

United Nations (U.N.) detachment found itself in trouble

around the port of Pusan.5

On September 15, forces

which had been staging in Japan made an amphibious landing
at Inchon (near Seoul), deep in the enemy's rear.

At the

same time, the troops holding the perimeter at Pusan made

a big offensive push, which succeeded in trapping the NKPA

Samuel B. Griffith, The Chinese People's

Liberation Army (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1967), pp. 114-115; U.S. Secretary Of Defense, The Report
Of The Secretary Of Defense's Advisory Committee On
Prisoners Of War, POW: The Fight Continues After The
Battle, August 1955, p. 7.
4

David Detzler, Thunder Of The Captains (New York;

Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1977), p. 191.
5

Edgar 0. Ballance, Korea: 1950-1953 (Connecticut;

Archon Books, 1969), pp. 36-47.

between the two forces.

This bold move, combined with

constant air and naval strikes, broke up the North Korean

advance, and sent them fleeing back across the 38th
fi/T

parallel.

On October 1, 1950, MacArthur asked General

Kim II Sung, North Korea's Chairman of the Military
Council, for his surrender.

The response to MacArthur's request came not from
Kim II Sung, but from China.

In a radio broadcast from

Peking, the United States was accused of entering Korea

with the purpose to "expand its aggression in the East,"
and due to this fact was seen to be a "most dangerous foe

to the People's Republic Of China."

They also hinted that

if United Nations Forces8 crossed the 38th parallel, China
Q

would enter the war.

By October 9, U.N. troops had advanced as far as
100 miles north of the parallel.

The Chinese again issued

Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army

In Action. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967),
p. 1.
■

7

The 38th parallel (north latitude) was a dividing

line as stipulated by Japan's surrender in World War II;
the Russians controlled north of the parallel while the
United States controlled south of the parallel.
8
The term "United Nations Forces" refers to United

States troops unless otherwise specified.
9
■. ■ ■
■
Griffith, The Chinese People's Liberation Army,

pp. 118-119.

"

~~~

~

^

^

a warning.

They stated that they "could not 'stand idly

by' in the face of the 'serious situation' created by the
10

invasion of Korea."

Washington chose to ignore this

message, with the State Department concluding that "Chinese
11

intervention in Korea was unlikely."

In late October, reports began filtering in indi
cating a large number of Chinese troops massing and moving
in North Korea.

These troops had been deployed from South

and Central China to Shantung and Manchuria just north of

the China-North Korea border as early as April, 1950.

12

There were three reasons that those reports were, for the
most part, ignored:
1.

The State Department's belief that.

Chinese intervention was unlikely, ^
2.

The Chinese moved mostly at night,
hiding in tunnels and villages during
the day, and often set forest fires for
screening against air reconnaissance,
which left, no overt signs of a moving

^°Ibid, p. 121.
11

U.S., Congress, Senate, Hearings Before The
Committee On Armed Services And The Committee On Foreign

Relations, Military Situation In The Far East, 82nd Cong.,
IstYsess., 1951, p. 1933*
12

Griffith, The Chinese People's Liberation Army,

13

U.S., Congress, Senate, Military Situation In
The Far East, p. 1933,

V 14
army,
and,

3.

Most of the reports came from peasant
or Givilian sources.^5
^

Even with the taking of Chinese prisoners, the U.N. Command
and the State Department would not change their

positions.

On November 2, the;U^S/ Army

Third/

I

Battalion of the Eighth Cavalry Regiment was surrounded

by the Chinese, sustained many dasualtiea, and be,came

ineffective as a fighting force.l^ The Chinese had
officially entered the war.
Meeting the Chinese for the first time with their

defenses down caused the U.N. forces to look upon their
enemy in unrealistic terms.

Due to the aggressiveness and

the "human waye" tactics used by the Chinese soldiers, they
were seen as "drug crazed fanatics" who could care less

about their own lives, let alone the lives of others.

1R

The effect was that the Chinese were seen as an all

■ 14

■

Matthew B. Ridgeway, The Korean War (New York:

Doubleday and Company, jnc., 19b7), p. 52.
lbid,, p., 52.

""^Ibid, p. 51. •
17. • .

Griffith, The Chinese People's Liberation Army,

■PP;. - .1;32-133.
■ ■ ■■ 'ISGeorge, The Chinese Communist Army In Action,
p. 2, ■.
^
~

powerful enemy, who could not be beaten.

long to show their civilized side.

They did not wait

This was through their

initial treatment of POWs.

On November 22, the Chinese released twenty-seven
severely wounded men to U.S. forces.

This came as a shock

to the U.N. Command, since they were accustomed to the
NKPA's killing POWs.

The soldiers were released after

being treated with kindness and sympathy, and it was found
that many Chinese soldiers shared their meager rations with

the prisoners.

The wounded soldiers were told to pass on

news of their favorable treatment, with instructions to

"urge them all [their comrades] to 'turn their guns against
officers' and thus free themselves from the oppression...
1Q/20

victims of capitalism (sic) suffered."

The first

attack on the minds of the servicemen was somewhat weak,
but was an indication of things to come.

The NKPA, it must be recalled, had a history of

maltreating POWs by torture or murder; the Chinese, on the
other hand, employed a more humane policy.

Soon after the

Chinese policy was enacted, radio broadcasts and Communist

19

Ridgeway, The Korean War, pp, 58-59.

20

When released, these individuals also carried

them propaganda leaflets.

Examples of these and other

leaflets are in Appendix 1.

Source: Charles J. Nilsson,

LTC, U.S. Army Retired, Assistant G-3, 2nd Infantry
Division, Korea 1950-1951, personal collection.

inspired writings authored by American POWs began pouring
21

out of North Korea.

The mystery as to why these actions

were taking place remained until Operation Little Switch

(April 1953), in which 149 sick and wounded POWs were
repatriated, and Operation Big Switch (August-September
22

1953), in which 3,323 were returned.

Once the statis

tics were out, the American people were shocked: it was

reported that approximately 38 percent of the POWs died in
captivity, and roughly one out of every three Americans
collaborated with the enemy at one time or another.

More

over, not one soldier successfully escaped from a permanent

camp, and for the first time in history, twenty-one
Americans refused to return home and decided to stay with
23

the enemy.

It was only after the U.S. Army and a team

of psychiatrists who studied and evaluated the returnees

that the basis for this peculiar behavior was labeled.
The word that was on the lips of all Americans was
24

"brainwashing."

21

Edward Hunter, Brainwashing: From Pavlov To

Powers (New York: The Bookmaker, 1962), p. 10.
22

Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 39.

^^Ibid, pp. 16-17.
24

The term "brainwashing" will be used throughout
this study wherever a general term applies. For other
terms see Appendix 2.

8

Brainwashing, or hai hao (wash brain), was the
unofficial name of the process that the Chinese Communists
used for "mind reform and re-education" of the people in
China.

The term was used in Red China only among trusted

friends or when a cadre

25

member would lose his temper

.26
and tell someone, "what you need is a good brain-wash."
At about the time that the U.N. forces had the NKPA

on the run, the term was first put into print in the United
States in an article published in the Miami Daily News.

The author was Edward Hunter (a journalist and it was not

known until recently), a Central Intelligence Agency
27

employee.

Hunter was stationed in Hong Kong in the late
1940's when he first came into contact with the Chinese

thought reform program.

He interviewed many men and women

who had been through the process and were leaving China for

25
Here cadre refers to the mediator between the

Communist Party, the State, and the masses. The term can
also refer to all party members at the lower levels. See
R. L. Walker, China Under Communism (London: Allen And

Unwin, 1956) p. 51.
26

Hunter, Brainwashing: From Pavlov To Powers,

p. 3.
27

Alan W. Scheflin and Edward M. Opton, The Mind

Manipulators (New York: Paddington Press, LTD, 1978),
p. 87.

28

good.

He found that brainwashing was the norm for

all men, women, and children who belonged to one of two
groups: foreigners or Chinese with "questionable baok
29

grounds."

"Before anyone could be considered trust

worthy, he was subjected to brain-washing...Only then did
on

the authorities consider that he could be depended upon."-'
This line of thought stems from the Chinese Communist's

belief that "all people retain ideological poisons" from

their previous society, with this poison needing removal in
order for the citizen to be able to take his place in the
31

"new society."

This action of removing the poison is

described by Hunter:

The intent is to change a
that its owner
becomes a

mind so radically so
living puppet-a human

robot-without the atrocity being visible from the
outside.

The

aim is

to create

a mechanism In

flesh and blood, with new beliefs and new thought
processes

inserted

that amounts to is

into a

captive

the search

for a

body.

What

slave race

that, unlike the slaves of olden times, can be
trusted never to revolt, always to be amenable to

28

Hunter, Brainwashing: From Pavlov To Powers,

p. 6.
29

Scheflin and Opton, The Mind Manipulators, p. 88.

30

Edward Hunter, Brainwashing In Red China: The
Calculated Destruction Of Men's Minds (New York: Vanguard

Press, Inc., 1951), p. 4.
31

T. H. Pear:, The Moulding Of Modern Man, (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1961), p. 121.

10

orders,

like an

insect

to its

insti
incts.

The

•ty,
intent is to atomize humanity.^^

Hunter saw this "intent to atomize humanity" as a real
threat to Americans and free people everywhere.

In

response to this perceived threat, the facts presented
above became the basis for his first book, Brainwashing In
Red China.

The purpose of Brainwashing In Red China has been
described as three-fold, with only the first two being
important to this study:
1.

To warn the American public of the
"spreading cancer of oriental

Communism,"^3

2.

3.

To look at Mao Tse-tungs attempts to
re-educate the people of Red China
through brainwashing and to condemn
those attempts,
and
To aid the CIA in gaining American
support for covert operations by

scaring them into a belief of some-_p
thing mysterious going on in China.

Although Hunter recognized the threat, his warning was not
heeded.

Someone once said that to be fore-warned

is to be

o2

Scheflin and Opton, The Mind Manipulators, p. 87.

^^Ibid, p. 23.
34
Hunter, Brainwashing: From Pavlov To Powers,
p. 3.
35

Scheflin and Opton, The Mind Manipulators,

p. 226.

■■

fore-armed.

■'

: tV

It has been suggested that if fore-warned,

the POWs might have fared better in Korea.

After

repatriation, the question asked again and again was, "Why

wasn't I told."

For those who were not told and captured,'

the war was not over—-it was also to be waged in the POW
■

camp.,

■

Such was the situation confronting American ground
troops in 1950.

They were vulnerable to Chinese brain

washing techniques for the following reasons: first, they

were sbldiers of a;peacetime army thrown into battle with
no information about their foe or reasons for being in

Korea.

Second, due; tof^e Sggi^sssiveness of the Chinese

soldier, it was assumed that all POWs would be murdered as
the NKPA had done; when given a reprieve, the psychological
impact was staggering.

Third, even though Hunter had

published works on the dangers of the Chinese brainwashing
program at the same time that broadcasts and written
propaganda were coming from the POW camps, no one paid any
attention to his warnings.

Consequently, the American

soldiers were hot prepared for what confronted them when

O f.

L. J. West, "Psychiatric Aspects Of Training

For Honorable Survival As A Prisoner Of War," American
Journal Of Psychiatry 115 (1958): pp. 334-3361 Virginia
Pasley, 21 Stayed, (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy,

1955), pp. 242-243; William E. Mayer, "Why Did Many GI
Captives Cave In?," U.S. News & World Report (February
24, 1956): p. 57; Hunter, Brainwashing: From Pavlov To
Powers, pp. 6, 16; Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 12.

■

12

they became POWs.

Finally, one must recall that China and

North Korea did not sign the Geneva Convention of 19^9, and
therefore were not legally bound by the Convention's
"rules" for the treatment of POWs.

II. BRAINWASHING: SOME DEFINITIONS

According to Edward Hunter, the reason for the

popularity of the term "brainwashing" was due to the fact
that "a vacuum in language existed...it described a
■37

strategy that had yet no name."

J. A. M. Merloo went

further and stated that "to name an object is to bring it

within the sphere of human control...without a name it
QQ

arouses fear, because it is unknown."

Once given the

name "brainwashing," it was initially used to describe the
process of thought reform used by the Chinese on their
people, but it soon spread to other Communist block
countries approaches to thought reform as well.

"It was

not long before anything the Communists did anywhere was

labeled as brainwashing."

39

As stated above however, it

was with the return of the POWs from Korea that put the

word in the dictionary and in the minds of the people of
the world.

With this rise in popularity, many writers have

37

Hunter, Brainwashing: From Pavlov To Powers,

p. 3.

^^Ibid, p. 4.
39

Robert J. Lifton, Thought Reform And The

Psychology Of Totalism (New York: W. W. Norton and Company,

Inc., 1961), p. 3.

>

u

presented various definitions of brainwashing.

Therefore,

it would be helpful at this stage to review these defini
tions with the purpose of arriving at_a single definition
which at best describes what took place in China during the

Communist takeover in 1948, and in the Korean POW camps
during the 1950's.

A definition which centers on the

brainwashing of groups will help the reader better under
stand the information presented in this paper.
Edward Hunter defined brainwashing as a technique

whereby "actual damage was done to a man's mind through
drugs, hypnotism, or other means so that a memory of what
actually happened would be wiped out of his mind and a new
40

memory of what never happened inserted."

This definition

was acceptable in 1950, given the limited knowledge of the
subject and psychology of the day.

Today, it has been

criticized because it insinuates that a memory can be

totally erased.

Based on the information obtained from

the Korean POWs, we now know that it is scientifically

impossible to completely erase one's memories, and that
past memories are still vivid; they have merely been
suppressed.

In Korea, one must also remember that there

was no documentation which indicated that drugs or hypnosis
were used on the prisoners.

40

Scheflin and Opton, The Mind Manipulators, p. 86.

-

■ ■

-

. . 15;;

In contrast to Hunter's definition. The Random
House Dictionary Of The English Language describes
brainwashing as "a method of systematically changing

attitudes Or altering beliefs, originated In totalitarian
countries, esp. through the use of torture, drpgs, or
■ - :4l'

psychological stress techniques."

'

This definition, as with Hunter's, is inadequate
due to the references to drugs and hypnosis.

Furthermore,

It states that it;originated In totalitarian countries,
which Is not true.

It has been traced

back to Ancient

Greece, a democracy, and was used In the rites of
priestS:^

.

> Alhh. Schef^

on the other hand, sees brainwashing

as an ideological

that takes place "when a

person has been compelled to believe subjectively a set of

principles originally alien to him.

Furthermore, the

means...must have beenaggrSsslve or violent, otherwise...
education or advertising would be brainwashing." ■

This definition is more appropriate for the

purpose of this siudy.

It eliminates from considera,tlon

41'■■■■"

The Random House Dictionary Of The English

Language, unab. ed. (1971), s.v. "brainwashing."
hp

William Sargant, Battle-For The Mind (Garden

City: Doubleday and Company"^ Inc., 1957), pp. 178-182.

43" . .'

■

Scheflln and Optoh, The Mind Manipulators

pp* 85-86.

16

advertising, education, and other forms of persuasion in
our society as nothing more than brainwashing.

More

importantly, it brings to light the fact that ideological
conversion is the objective of the process, which has been
44

stated by many others as well.

Scheflin's definition,

although an improvement on Hunter's, is still not fully
suitable for the purpose of this paper.

Robert Merloo, in his book Rape Of The Mind, coined
the term "menticide" to describe the brainwashing process

as it has taken place through time.

Menticide was derived

from "mens", meaning the mind, and "caedere", meaning to
45

kill.

He sees brainwashing as a crime against the mind

originating from the days of torture in earlier times.

It

differs from torture because in modern times it has a new

twist, which he has aptly named, "the refinement of the
46
rack."

Merloo describes menticide as "an attack on

man's very mind, on his sovereign will and conviction.
It destroys free thought and makes servile, mechanical

44
For a detailed discussion of this matter see

pp. 77 to 81.
45

Merloo's idea for the term was taken from the

word genocide, which means the systematic killing of a
racial group.
46

J. A. M. Merloo, The Rape Of The Mind Cleveland:
The World Publishing Co., 1956), pp. 27-2b.

17

217

instruments of his inviolate thought process."

After

being subjected to this process, the subject usually
conforms to the demands or requests of his interrogators.
Merloo further states that such a condition confuses those

interacting with the subject since the process involves
conflicting ideas and information.

This leaves doubt as to

48
what is true or false and whom to believe or trust.

This

last statement is very important to this study, as it

brings to light the effectp that brainwashing has on a
group.

Robert Lifton sees brainwashing as "thought
reform", and believes it comes from the Chinese word szu

hsiang kai-tsao, which means ideological remoulding,
llQ

ideological reform, or thought reform.

During a visit to

Hong Kong, he became involved in studying several individu
als who escaped from Mainland China and had been subjected
to the Chinese thought reform program.

He hypothesized

after interviewing several who had been through the pro
gram, that what they had been through was a much more

47

Idem, "The Crime Of Menticide," American Journal
Of Psychiatry 107 (1951): p. 595.
48

Idem, The Rape Of The Mind, p. 28.

49

Lifton was one of a few psychiatrists involved in
the evaluation of POWs repatriated in Operation Big Switch
and Little Switch.

18

powerful, coraprehehsive, and effective program than the one

that the POWs went through.

He saw both programs, however,

as bringing "into play a series of pressures and appeals—

intellectual, emotional, and physical—aimed at social
control and individual change."

These pressures and

appeals use the group as social manipulators.50

Thus, the

group is not only affected by someone going through the

process (as Merloo indicates), but it also becomes an
instrument in the process.
Still another author, Edgar Schein, used the term
"coercive persuasion" to describe the process that American
civilians imprisoned in China were subjected to.

He felt

that "what happened to the prisoners was that they were

subjected to unusually prolonged persuasion from which they
could not escape...they were coerced into allowing them
51

selves to be persuaded."

To Schein, this indicated that

a prisoner was not merely a passive recipient or informa

tion taker, but that he participated in the process, in
which a "genuine clash of beliefs and points of view were
52

involved."

.

The result was an avoidance-avoidance

50

Lifton, Thought Reform And The Psychology Of
Totalism, p. 4.
5j.

Edgar Schein, Coercive Persuasion (New York:

W. W. Norton and Company'^ Inc., 19bO, p. 1«.

^^Ibid, p. 19.

19

conflict, in which the prisoner was confronted by two or
(5-3

more undesirable alternatives.

Consequently, in order to

survive he permitted himself to be persuaded.

It should be noted that the brainwashing process
retains its grip on the individual only as long as one is

in such an environment.

Once free of this environment, one

does not generally practice those beliefs which were forced

upon him.

In other words, the effects of brainwashing are

54
not permanent.

This statement can be verified from the

behavior of the POWs who returned from Korea as well as

by the American and Chinese civilian prisoners who were
■

returned from China.

Therefore, after reviewing these definitions, for
the purpose of this paper brainwashing will be defined as
follows:

Brainwashing

is

an

attempt

conversion which tries to get
subjectively something that

at

ideological

a group to believe
is alien to them.

The process must be violent or aggressive in
nature, and consists of intellectual, emotional,
and physical pressures. The results are that the
victims conform, as there are not acceptable
alternatives left open to them.
This leaves

doubt as to what is true and false, with conflict
as to who to believe or trust.

The process fails

53

Audrey Haber and Richard P. Runyon, Fundamentals
Of Psychology (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,

1974), pp. 426-427.'
54

Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation Of Men's

Attitudes (Toronto: Knopf'J Random, 1965), pT 313; Merloo,
The Rape Of The Mind, p. 34.

20

if the individual leaves the sterile brainwashing
environment.

With this definition in mind, the Communist methods
of brainwashing used on the people of China and American
servicemen captured in Korea and held by the Chinese will
be explored.

III. BRAINWASHING IN CHINA AND NORTH KOREA

The Application Of Brainwashing In China
The Communist Party Reform Movement of 1942-1944

laid the groundwork for China's future.

Since they had

been greatly influenced by the Soviet Union, the Reform
Movement centered around the thoughts of Marx and Lenin.

It was for this reason that China's thought reform program
(also known as brainwashing) was derived from Russia'as
55

well.^^

The Civil War between the Chinese Communists and

Chiang K'ai-shek's Nationalists was taking place when the
Russian Secret Police intervened on the side of the

Communists.

Since it was in their best interests that the

Nationalists be defeated, they taught their secret tech4
niques of brainwashing to the Communists in order to help
them win the minds of the people.

Its existence in Russia

was not well known due to the fact that when it was put to
use on an individual, once they got what they wanted out of

him, he was eliminated.

In China, however, the process

could not be hidden because those subjected were not

eliminated (with the target group being all of China,

55

Walker, China Under Communism, pp. 54-55.

22

instead of a few individuals as in Russia).

The large

scale application of such a process was difficult to keep
secret.

This thought reform program was in use throughout
China when Mao Tse-tung became the Chairman of the

Communist Party in 19^9.

He continued its use because he

felt that all man's possessions belonged to the Chinese
57

Communist Party, including his mind.

Mao's policy on

brainwashing is best described in the following statement:
to integrate individuals
into the new body
politic as deeply as possible, and, at the same
time, to detach them from the old groups, such as
the family or traditional village organizations.
These
groups must
be disintegrated, always

through action from within.58
This statement shows that Mao Tse-tung's use of

brainwashing had as its objective the breaking down of
group cohesion.

It should follow therefore, that the

extent and quality of this group breakdown would be the key
to its success.

This was, in fact, the method used by the

Chinese Communists in their quest for control during their

Civil War (and which was later used in the Korean War).
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Hunter, Brainwashing: From Pavlov To Powers,

p. 9.
57

Peter Carter, Mao (London: Oxford University
Press, 1967), p. 127.
58

Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation Of Men's
Attitudes, p. 308.

A

23

more comprehensive explanation on Chinese brainwashing is
contained in the The Wang Report.

Wang Tsun-ming was an anti-Communists counter

intelligence officer with Chiang K'ai-shek from 1946 to
1950.

His work dealt with studying the "Communist methods

for seizing and consolidating power over communities and

over groups of people.

Upon capture in 1950 by

Communist forces, he was subjected to the very process he
had been observing for four years.

After a year of this

brainwashing, he was sent to Korea as a private to fight
the Americans.

Upon arriving in North Korea, he made

his way to American forces; not to fight them, but to
surrender.

His information on the Communist's methods of

brainwashing as applied to groups is the subject of a U.S.
Army study entitled. The Wang Report.

The highlights of

that report are described below.

In his debriefing with U.S. intelligence officers

in 1953, Wang began by stating that when a village was
singled out for Communist takeover, the total process

would usually take about eight months. In the beginning,
soldiers would move into the Village, share simple slogans
and new ideas, and help the villagers in their work.

Their

purpose during this "helping period" was not to convert

59

Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 89.
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people to Communism (though at times it did), but to
discover all they could about the village, the people in
it, and how the town interacted with surrounding villages.
Upon learning all they needed to know, they
approached the town "undesirables" and informed them that
they were to become the town leaders.

These future leaders

were called "progressives" by the Communists.

A town

meeting was then called, with the progressives planted

among the villagers with instructions to present grievances
against the upper class.

These rich were accused of

exploitation of the people for their own selfish gains, and
were then forced to confess such "crimes" publicly.

The

progressives would not accept the confessions of the rich,
and would beat them and accuse others in the audience of

exploitation as well.

Subsequently, the Communists then

turned the poor farmers against the progressives, and
consequently more accusations and more confessions took

place.

With this growing confusion and anomie among the

villagers, all of the farms were confiscated by the
Communists and the land redistributed.

The best land was

given to those who would further the Communist cause once

the soldiers left the area.

With this, the group was on

its way to total disorganization and breakdown, as Wang
went on to show.

The final act was to bind the people back together
as one under Communism.

They accomplished this by forcing

25

a randomly picked man who had caused trouble during the

takeover, to confess to "crimes" during a village meeting.

Those given the best land (seen as the "new progressives"),
were strategically placed throughout the crowd to aid in

fostering hostility toward the victim by the villagers.

The result would be that the whole town—men, women, and
children--would take part in beating the man to death.
With everyone taking part in the killing, they would thus

be "bound to each other and to Communism by a common stigma
of blame.

The emphasis of Wang's report centered on the

Communists strategy of creating chaos, disorganization, and
anomie within the village.

"They were not satisfied with

turning class against class; they went inside of each

family, to turn individuals against each other and so

loosen irreparably the cement that held together the class
51

itself."

The village's conversion to Communism was

therefore seen as the result of the total breakdown

in

group cohesion.

The Application Of Brainwashing In Korea

In relationship to the above, while looking at

^"^Ibid, p. 89-94.
^^Ibid, p. 91-94.
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this process as it was applied in the Chinese controlled

prisoner of war camps in North Korea, one might keep in
mind the following statements made by Colonel Willis A.

Perry, at the time of the prisoner's repatriation one of

the intelligence officers responsible for security matters
of the returning POWs.

He believed that:

The principles used to

undermine and

weaken our

men and their relationships were basically the
same as those
used
in
China except
that
psychological' pressures replaced the physical
ones....In China, the Communists were seeking to
purge

reactionary

the land; in the
to

isolate

elements

and to redistribute

prison camps, their

reactionaries

and

goals were
redistribute

ideas...They could not obtain these results with
beatings, torture, and death...If the Communists
had tortured or killed our men, their buddies
would have banded together in a unified way to

resist their captors.62
As we shall see, the Chinese would not give the prisoners
this opportunity to unite.

The application of the Chinese techniques of brain

washing in the North Korean POW camps
64

by many writers.

has been summarized

For the most part, they all agree on

^^Ibid, pp. 94, 102.
Throughout this paper, North Korean POW ckmps
will refer soley to those controlled by the Chinese unless
otherwise specified.
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what the soldier experienced while in enemy hands.

There

fore, for the purpose of this paper I will rely mostly on
Schein's work, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
Prisoners Of War," as he goes into much greater detail than
the others.

However, reference will also be made to others

when it becomes necessary to fill in gaps or to make a

point clearer.

The following summary thus represents the

average experience of the American Army POW in Korea, and
will show that the breakdown of group cohesion was a key
element in the Chinese techniques of brainwashing.

The soldiers who were taken prisoner in Korea, did
not fit into any pattern as to how they fell into enemy
hands.

Some were members of units that were surrounded

overrun by the Chinese.

or

Others were separated from their

units due to the shifting front that was common in Korea,
with these individuals soon finding American lines in their

rear.

Consequently, many of these individuals (as well as
55

large combat elements), became POWs of the Chinese.

After being captured, the first few hours in the

Congress, House, Committee On Un-American Activities,
Communist Psychological Warfare (Brainwashing),
consultation with Edward Hunter, 85th Cong., 2nd sess.,

March 13, 1958, pp. 1-25; Albert D. Biderman, March To
Calumny (New York; The MacMillan Company, 1963); Mayer,
"Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?," pp. 58-72.
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Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
Prisoners Of War," p. 150.
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hands of the Chinese were frightening due to rumors that

had been spread throughout the units about the treatment
one could receive.

The newly captured prisoner expected

torture and death; by not being killed outright however,
their fears of being killed were soon alleviated
After getting the prisoner away from the front

lines, the Chinese went to great lengths to show that they

were friendly and humane.

They would meet their captives

with outstretched hands, offer them congratulations on
being released from the Capitalist bonds, and give them
food and cigarettes.

Emphasis was put on the fact that

they were lucky not to have fallen into the hands of the

North Koreans, as they would not be alive.

The prisoners

were repeatedly asked if they were for peace, as were the
Chinese.

If they answered affirmatively, they were then

promised to be released if they "did well," "cooperated,"
68

and "learned the truth."

This strategy had the effect

of elevating the enemy in the minds of the POWs.

All of

the horror stories they had previously heard and believed

were obviously not true—the Chinese soldiers were kind and

^^Ibid, pp. 150-151.
fiT

Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 94.
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Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
Prisoners Of War," pp. 151-152.
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a humane people.

After gaining a little of the POW's trust

during this initital meeting, the mardh to the permanent
camp was begun.

This jouhhey would take the prisoners

initially to temporary camps (which were not far from the

permanent camps) in order that the prisoners might rest,
while the guards could observe their reactions to their
'

69

ordeal (i.e. look for potential collaborators).

The conditions during the march to the camps took
their toll on the prisoners.

As the Chinese had not

thought of how they were going to feed the prisoners during

the march, they usually had to buy what they could from

local villagers..

The food they bought was insufficient,

with the calorie content well below that of the soldier's
70

normal diet.

In addition, the men were usually given

drinking water only once a day, therefore, to quench their

thirst, it was not uncommon for them to drink water found

in ditches or, if the season was Vight, to eat snow.

Under

these conditions, the men soon began to suffer from

^^Ibid, p. 152.
70

The calorie content of what the men were getting

on the march and in the camps amounted:to between 800-1200
calories; they were accustomed to the Army combat ration of
3,500 calories. In addition, their diet was deficient in
proteins, minerals, and vitamins; see Kinkead, In Every War

But One, pp. 142-143.
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diarrhea, which left them in a very weak state.
Due to the fact that all of the Chinese camps were

on the China-North Korea border, the journey could be up to
300 miles in length, depending on the location of the front
■

■ 72 '

and where captured.

The columns moved only under the

cover of darkness (as daylight brought the fear of U.S. air

strikes), while averaging twenty miles per night.

During

daylight halts, propaganda leaflets and Communist songs
were distributed, as was news of Chinese victories.

After

allowing the priSohers time to read and digest this infor

mation, a discussion of the content followed.

During this

period, anything that the prisoners wished to discuss could
also be bronght up.

Many times the conditions of the

march, particularly the lack of food, was the subject of
these conversations.

The Chinese would remind the POWs

that the Chinese soldiers were eating the same food, and
enduring the same hardships.

Moreover, they were reminded

that the prisoners were allowed to keep their own clothing

7^

William Lindsey White, The Captives Of Korea (New

York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), pp. 46-4b.
72'
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■

Biderman, March To Calumny, pp. 96, 202; see map

in""Appendix 3/. ■
■; ■ ■ js

■ :■ • ■ ■ ■ ■ ■V
.
Schein states that not all men participated in

these foot marches, however, it seemed, to be the norm; see
Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For Prisoners
Of.War," p. 151.
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and were protected from the North Koreans and any guards
74

who got too aggressive.

Consequently, since they

were all going through bad times together, the POWs were
asked to hold on until they could get to the temporary

camps.

Because of these hardships, "Lines of authority

tended to break down, and the prevailing attitude was
'every man for himself.' Open competition for food,
clothing, and shelter made the maintenance of group ties
■'

almost impossible,"

75

The thought of better conditions

at the temporary camps is what kept most POWs going.

For

many however, this was not enough and many perished during
the march.

For those who made it to the temporary camps, the
conditions were actually worse than during the march.

Disease, lack of food, and exposure to the elements took
many lives.

The lack of better treatment was blamed either

on United Nations' air strikes (which the Chinese claimed

destroyed much of the food in North Korea), or the failure

74

White disagrees with this point. In his example
he showed the guards as brutal and being replaced every few
days. As the norm seems to be as stated above, we will go
with that interpretation, with the understanding that
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Prisoners Of War," p. 151.
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Additionally, although prisoners

were inadequately guarded in, these temporary camps, few

attempts to escape were made.

The reasons for this has

been attributed to weakness due to the lack of proper food

and rest, fear of capture by the North Koreans, and to the
concept of every man for himself.

Schein explains that,

"It was difficult to maintain close group ties if one was
77

competing with others for the essentials of life."

It is

therefore not surprising that the prisoners that reached

the permanent camps were not only mentally and physically

drained, but were lacking in group cohesion due to the
inability to satisfy basic biological needs.
The permanent FOW camps were usually part of a

small village, separated by either man-made or natural
barriers.

The POWs permanent quarters consisted of mud

huts, with straw matting to Sleep on.

Other prominent

buildings included a mess hall, latrine, Chinese officer
and enlisted quarters, and a large building used for
lectures and administrative purposes.

The facilities were

inadequate according to Schein, "but far better than in
temporary camps."

Furthermore, although guards and

barriers were present, they were inadequate for the number

77

Edgar H. Schein, "Reaction Patterns To Severe,
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of POWs in the oamp.

The physical set-up was therefore not

a deterrent for anyone wishing to escape or venture into
78

the adjoining village.

Upon arrival at the permanent camp, the prisoners

were greeted by the senior interrogator of the camp.

This

interrogator and his assistants were unique in that they
were well educated and could speak English fluently.

Their

knowledge of the United States was extensive, and it has
been stated that "they were often so conversant with

American slang, and so knowledgeable about Stan Musial's
batting average or the landmarks along U.S. Highway No. 1,
that many of them might have just got off a plane from the
States.

The interrogator's job was to find out all he could

from the prisoner under the guise of friendship.

The POWs

were all led to a room where they were asked to fill out a

form with heading of the International Red Cross.

The

reason given for answering the approximately 140 questions
was to enable the Chinese to have enough information to

inform the U.S. Army, friends, and relatives that the
80

prisoner was alive and well.

The actual purpose of the
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Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
Prisoners Of War," p. 152.
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Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 99-100.

®°Ibid, pp. 95-96.
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form was to arrive at the prisonerVs socio-economic status

and to discover any weakness in the individual which could
■ 31. . ■ ■

be exploited.

■ '

"They sized up each prisbner's

character to find out whether he carried a grudge against
"82

his superiors, his neighbors, or society in general."

Through this and other means, the Chinese gathered "the

largest fund of information about the American soldier ever
acquired by hn enemy...Cthis] provided the Communist with
intelligence they could never have obtained from other
sources."

The purpose of later interrogation was to

either gather information of military nature or to gain

further knowledge about the prisoner, both of which could
be used as instruments of blackmail in the future.

What

ever the reason, the POW was always put in a situation

where if he lied, the interrogator would know it.

For

example, the Chinese would call in the same prisoner for
days trying to get information about a piece of military
equipment.

When the POW lied, he would go through the

confession as listed below.

If he would say nothing, the

^''ibid, p. 95.
8P ■ '

U.S., Congress, House Communist Psychological

Warfare (Brainwashing), p. 16.

^^Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 115^116.
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interrogator might go as far as to move in with the

prisoner as a ploy to get him talking about anything.
After many days of this, the interrogator would call in the
prisoner and ask him the question again.

With a lie or no

answer given, the interrogator would pull out the Army
Technical Manual on the piece of equipment, and read in
84

great deal the specifications he had been asking for.

This has been referred to as the "deception" technique,8'S
and leads the individual to believe that the interrogator

knows the answers to his questions, so it saves him a lot
of time and he confesses by answering the questions
86

correctly.

Questions regarding the prisoner's personal

history were already in the hands of the interrogator, who
was armed with the individual's Red Gross form (which was

previously mentioned).

Any deviation from the information

on that form was used to discredit the soldier.

In this

manner, the Communists determined who were good candidates

for brainwashing and, after being indoctrinated, would be

84
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useful to them in organizing the POW camp.

The organization of the camp followed the "company"
scheme which was familiar to the U.S. soldiers.

In a

standard infantry company, there are four platoons, with
the platoons broken down into four squads.

Each POW camp

had between three to seven of these companies, with approx
imately 200 men per company.

Each company consisted of

three to four platoons which were broken into six squads,
R7

each squad having from six to fifteen POWs.

The very

structure of the companies had the appearance of a military

unit, which consists of formal chains of command, rank

structure, etc..

The chain of command and rank structure,

however, were dominated by the Chinese.

They put their own

people in charge of the companies and .platoon, with lower
ranking POWs as squad leaders.

They meant to emphasize

that under Communism all were equal, and rank was unimpor
tant.

Schein has described this policy as "a systematic

attempt to undermine the internal structure of the group

by removing its leaders...the noncommissioned officers,
who were at first in the enlisted camps, were put into a
special camp when the Chinese found out that they were
quite effective in keeping the other men from various kinds
of collaboration.

ft7

It was reported that this segregation

Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 102-103.
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was often followed by a considerable increase in collab
88

oration, particularly among the younger enlisted men,"

Moreover, the Chinese not only separated the POWs by rank,
but also by race and nationality.

The prisoners were separated by race and nation
ality in an attempt to exploit minorities.

The basis for

this type of separation can be traced in the history of
prisoner of war camps as a successful tactic.

In our Civil

War, both the North and South concentrated on men from

border states as possible turncoats; in World War I, the
Germans targeted the Irishmen among the British forces; in

World War II, the United States worked on the Austrian
89

prisoners; in Korea, it was the Negro,

Puerto Rican,

and other Spanish speaking Americans whom the Chinese

targeted.

The Chinese felt that due to racial problems and

discrimination in the U.S., these minorities could be
easily exploited and indoctrinated.

It was for this reason

88

Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
Prisoners Of War," p. 153.
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that a lot of time and pressure was spent on the American
POW minorities in the Chinese held camps.
Thus far, it has been shown that the breakdown of

the prisoner group was initially aided by the withholding
of physical necessities, isolation of leaders, and segre
gation of the men by race, rank, and nationality.

The

Chinese enhanced this breakdown through the use of spies,
informers, rewards, and manipulation of the mail.

Their

purpose was to put a halt to all friendships, emotional
bonds, and group activities that were not beneficial to
<51

them.^

Spies and informers were very important in the
breakdown of the group according to Schein: "The men

reported that the Chinese were forever sneaking around

their quarters and listening to conversations or observing
activities from hidden posts, and they also knew that some
of their number were acting as informers."

These informers

gave the Communists information about everything that took

place in the camp, such as what groups were forming, who
was planning an escape, who the troublemakers were, etc.Q2
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Anyone disoovered or caught participating in any of the
above activities, or violating any of the camp rules was
subject to disciplinary action.

The punishment employed by the Chinese was usually
psychological in nature, although the fear of physical
abuse and/or mistreatment was always of great concern to
the prisoners.

This was due to the fact that no matter

how trivial or insignificant the "crime," the wrongdoings
were made to look monumental, resulting in the POW's

writing a self-criticism statement.

The purpose of these

statements were not only to produce guilt and anxiety in
the prisoner, but also to be used as an initial step in
94

collaboration.

1.

The procedure used was as follows:

A crime took place (it could be as
insignificant as not bowing in the
presence of a Chinese guard).

2.

The prisoner was brought in front of
the camp commander.

3.

The camp commander informed the
prisoner of the seriousness of the

crime, and stressed that if the policy
of the Chinese was not so lenient, he
he would be severely punished.

93

The mere threat of death or non-repatriation was

especially frightening.

The prisoners understood that they

could be listed as having died of a jungle disease or heart
problem, and no one would know the real cause.
94

Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Capitves Cave In?,"

p. 72.
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4.

The commander would then ask the POW

for his apologies, and ask that he
not behave in such a "criminal" manner

again.

5.

If the prisoner was indeed sorry, he
was asked to write a self-^criticism

statement, which did not seem to be
too much to ask considering the
punishment he could receive.

6.

Lastly, he would then have to present
his oral statement to a group of
prisoners, who would discuss the
seriousness of the crime and the

ramifications if such a crime were

allowed to continue taking place in
the camp.

This discussion would be

monitored by either the Chinese or a
POW working for the enemy.
Such public self-criticism was degrading and humil

iating to the prisoner and only added to his confusion
since he did not know, who his friends really were.

As

fellow prisoners took part in the discussion, they were
often so convincing in their arguments that he would not be
sure who actually believed what he did was a crime.

In

addition, since it was impossible not to violate a rule or
anger a guard, one would soon be on report again.

This

time the camp commander would show more anger because of

the prisoner's second violation.

The POW would again be

willing to write a statement to alleviate the commander's

95

Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
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anger, even if it was of more use to the Chinese than the

previous one.

In time, he would again be back in the

commander's office, writing still another but more signifi
cant statement.

In this way the prisoner had progressed

from writing a small, useless statement (i.e., he should

follow the rules more closely) to v/riting one of greater
significance (i.e., he was involved in the killing of

innocent civilians).96
The

William Mayer has concluded that.

self-criticism

amounted

to

a

virtual

confession..,a great many soldiers participated
in it without realizing that this was what was
happening. Moreover, confessions were eventually
required to implicate others.
Once a man
confessed about himself, the Communists would
urge him: 'Now let's go a step further.
Why
don't you talk about your fellow prisoners'
problems as well as your own?' It is very simple
to see what happened
next.
These documents

became not

only

confessions,

but

accusations-

depositions of an informer.97
It is now understandable why many repatriated POWs made the
98

comment, "You could not rely on anyone."

The Chinese's use of rewards was also effective in

undermining the group.

It was common knowledge throughout

the camp that if one cooperated, the Chinese would reward

you with fruit, cigarettes, a blanket, etc.

Whenever an

96
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informer or spy would report a troublemaker or a group

leader, instead of physically removing him (which would
leave the group intact), they would simply make him look
like he was working for them.

For example, a prisoner

thought to be a group leader would be removed from his
company for a day or two.

He would then be asked to make a

broadcast or sign a self-criticism statement once away from
his peers.

This was merely a front, because while he was

gone, the Chinese would inform his peers that he was
working for them.

Upon his return to camp, he would be

given tangible rewards for all to see.

This action would

arouse suspicion and hostility in others, and break down

any ties there may have been.

As a result, it was not

uncommon for this individual to begin to collaborate in
order to gain more privileges.

He would rationalize his

actions by believing that he was doing no harm or that he
99

was doing it as a service by gathering intelligence.

He eventually was cut off from all ties with his friends

since no one would trust him, not even other collaborators.
He became isolated from other Americans in the camp, and
only had the mail from home to keep him in touch with his
former society.
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Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For

Prisoners Of War," pp. 160-161.
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The mail, however, offered no salvation for the

POW, since his captors were in control of that also.

They

did not attempt to censor the mail in the usual way (by

deleting certain phrases or words).

Instead, they withheld

the letteh.^^^ Kinkead has stated that whether the
mail was outgoing or incoming, "The liklihood of a letter's
reaching its destination increased proportionally with
the amount of material it contained favorable to the
101

Communists."

Thus, outgoing letters filled with the

appropriate propaganda or incoming letters containing bad

news had a very good chance of reaching its destination.
Another tactic used by the Chinese was to blame the
United States for the lack of mail that the HOW received.

The number of excuses mentioned were so legitlipate sounding
that they were believed by some of the FOWs.

Examples of

such reasons included: "Americans are too busy to write to

you;" "The U.S. Army has not forwarded :any mail;" or "U.S.
bombing raids destroyed the mail awaiting distribution in

North Korea."

Consequently, a "friendly" Communist (an

interrogator or guard) would often offer to look into the
matter in order to help his "comrade."

Oftentimes, within

a few days, he would give several letters to the prisoner.

^Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 121.
101
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This evoked a sense of gratitude in the POW, and even
though he could not trust anyone else in the camp, he could
trust his Communist friend. 1 OP

This procedure was used

by the Chinese whenever it suited tlieir purpose.
■ ■

I

In commenting on these tactics, Edward Hunter

states that, "The Communist interrogators, as the brain-

washers called themselves, sought toj remove a man's trust
■

'

•

''

i

in his own side, and to convince him that he was being let
down and even betrayed by his own coiantry and relatives...

The Reds sought to deprive him of all hope."^^^ Edgar
Schein further adds that the outcomeiof the above treatment
1

was that It "helped to create a feel|Lng of general distrust
...the only fully safe course was to'withdraw from all
!

I o Ji

Intimate interaction with other prisoners."

While the Chinese were in the process of breaking
down the group solidarity, the FOWs went about their normal

daily routine.

It consisted of streriuous work details,

such as gathering wood, carrying wate;r, repairing roads.

^°^Ibid, pp. 121-122.
1 03r, „

U.S. ^
Congress, House, Communist Psychological
Warfare (Brainwashing), p. 16.
!
104

.

!

Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
Prisoners Of War," pp. 153-154.
!

■ ^5
1QC

and the general maintenance of the camp.

Another part

of the daily routine consisted of attending indoctrination
classes for five hours.

106

There were two main reasons the

prisoners were required to participate in the classes.

First, as stated by Mayer, the Chinese "obviously believed
that the average American soldier was poorly informed to an

extreme degree about his own country, his own economic and
political systems; was even more poorly informed about the
politics, economics, and social problems of other

countries;.,.and was a man who, if deprived of material

sources of support, would prove to be insecure, easily
manipulated and controlled, lacking in real loyalties and
107

convictions."

Second, aS, the U.N. entrance into the

Korean War was considered a criminal act by the Chinese,
the POWs were to be treated as "students," so that they
could learn the truth about the facts of Communism and U.S.
.

■ 108

aggression.

As a student, the prisoner had to listen to

105

""^Ibid, p. 152.
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Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. IO3.
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Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cavein?,"

p. 58.
108

Schein, '^Reaction Patterns To Severe, Chronic
Stress In American Army Prisoners Of The Chinese," p. 22.
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lectures and radio broadcasts, and read material slanted

toward the Communist point of view.^^^ They stressed the
social, political, and economic problems in the United

States and compared them to a more promising way of

life—Communism.

At the conclusion of each lecture, the

prisoners were given questions to discuss and answer.

These discussions would be monitored by both Chinese and

POW monitors.

After a predetermined amount of time, each

individual would be required to submit his answers to the

lecturer.

If the answers were unacceptable, the process

would start over again, until the individual's answer were

accepted.

110

The effect of this process was as follows:

There is an endless repetition
explanations, and simple stimuli.
the

beginning

all

this

subject's scorn and disbelief.

merely

of formulas,
Of course, in
evokes

the

After some time,

however, erosion takes place; whether the subject
likes it or not, he ends up knowing by heart
certain formulas of the catechism repeated to him
a thousand times; he ends up inhabited by these
slogans, which still carry no conviction...But it
must not be forgotten that the prisoner hears
nothing else, and that the incessant repetition
of these slogans also prevents any personal

109

This reading material included not only

Communist Party publications, but writings by Tolstoy,
Charles Dickens, Upton Sinclair, and John Steinbeck to name
a few. These writers highlight aspects of Capitalism which
were unacceptable to the Communists; see Kinkead, In Every
War But One, p. 103.
110

.

Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
Prisoners Of War," pp. 155, 157.
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reflection

or

meditation...The

result

is

an

involuntary
penetration
and
a
certain
intellectual
weakening,
added
to
the
impossibility of leading a private intellectual
life.Ill

The outcome was that given the one-sidedness of the
argument, "Half-truths and even entire lies sounded

convincing...The inquisitors gave our men nothing to think
112

of except Communism."

Furthermore, if the lectures

did not enlighten the prisoner as far as the lecturer was
liq

concerned, he could be put into solitary confinement.

This would allow him to reflect on the Communist viewpoint,
while at the same time, question his own beliefs as well.
In the Spring of 1950, the first "peace committees"
were organized as instruments of propaganda and to further
,

.

114

aid the brainwashing process.

POWs were recruited for

these committees either on the basis of their prior work

for the Communists, or for the purpose of discrediting a
particular prisoner.

Those recruited were chosen by the

111

Ellul, Propaganda; The Formation Of Men's
Attitudes, p. 312.
112

U.S. Congress, House, Communist Psychological
Warfare (Brainwashing). pp. 16-17.
113

This was not the only reason a prisoner was put
in solitary confinement; other reasons included punishment

for resistance, disrespect to guards, etc.
114

Dixon, "Duress And Coercion: A Defense Of
Collaborating," p. 239.

^8

"democratic" method.

An election would be held, but

everyone knew that the one favored by the Communists would

win.

If he did not, the election was held again and again

until he was elected.

115

In this manner, the Chinese

had the men they wanted serving on the committees.
The loyalties of the other prisoners was a critical
factor that had to be contended with if chosen to be a mem-^

ber of (or in dealing with) the peace committee, since no
one knew who was working for the Chinese or who was merely

pretending to do so.

"If a man was pretending, he had to

hide this carefully lest a real pro
Chinese.

11^

turn him in to the

Yet a man who sincerely believed in the Chinese

peace effort had to hide this fact from others who might be
pretenders, for fear that they might harm him directly or

blacklist him for the future, at the same time convincing
117

other pro's that he really was sincerei"

This "Catch

115

Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
Prisoners Of War," p. 154.
116

Pro's, also known as progressives and partici
pators, were those prisoners who aided the enemy whenever

possible in order to gain rewards, special treatment, etc;
see Julius Segal, "Correlates Of Collaboration And

Resistance Behavior Among U.S. Anmy POWs In Korea," The
Journal Of Social Issues 3 (1957); p. 32.
■ ■ ■ ■ 117

Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For

Prisoners Of War," p. 155.
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22,"

in which the prisoner was in trouble with his

fellow prisoners if he was known to be a pro, and on the

other hand, was in trouble with the Chinese if he was found
to be pretending, is further evidence of the overall group
breakdown that occured and the problem it caused.

A POW in

fact had to be a good actor, and not say the wrong thing at

the wrong time in order to stay out of trouble with the
Chinese or his fellow prisoners.

In June of 1951, it was suggested by the Soviet
Ambassador to the United Nations that talks should begin in

order to put an end to the hostilities in Korea.
months later, negotiations began.

119

Two

Admiral C. Turner Joy,

then Senior Delegate and Chief of the United Nations

Command Delegation to the Korean Armistice Conference,
brought up the matter of exchanging names of their respec
tive prisoners of war to the North Korean delegates.

A

sub-committee was formed, and by the end of the year, lists
were exchanged.

120

It has been suggested by Leslie Dixon

118
A "Catch 22" can

be seen as an avoidance-

avoidance conflict, most accurately described as, "You're
damned if you do and damned if you don't;" see Joseph
Heller, Catch 22 (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc.,

1955), p. 47.
119

C. Turner Joy (Adm, USN Ret), How Communists

Negotiate (New York: The MacMillan Company^ 1965), pi T.

""^^Ibid, pp. 148-150.
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that the exchange accounted for the fact that conditions

began to improve for the POWs.

With these improved condi

tions came fewer deaths and fewer charges of collaboration

for the time period that followed, since the brainwashing
program also came to an end.

121

The information presented in Chapter Three has

shown that the breakdown of formal and informal groups and
restricting normal relationships was an important variable

in explaining the behavior of American POWs.

Although this

breakdown was found to be a "key factor" in the brain
washing process, there were other factors that aided in

this breakdown.

It is necessary therefore to explore some

of these factors, especially the various theoretical

interpretations, to further clarify what took place in the
Chinese held POW camps.

121

Dixon, "Duress And Coercion: A Defense Of
Collaborating," p. 239.

IV. SOME THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF BRAINWASHING

The Psyoho-physiologioal Explanation

In the article, "Communist Interrogation and
12?

Indoctrination of 'Enemies Of The State',"

Lawrence E.

Hinkle Jr., and Harold G. Wolff recognize that in Korea,
the Communists were successful in "demoralizing" American

soldiers.

They believe that initially the demoralizing

process was accidental, resulting from supply and communi
cation problems, inadequate facilities, and the insensi
tivity of the peasant soldier.

Later however, the use of

informers and the segregation of leaders greatly aided the
Chinese in achieving their goal.

In using the psycho-physiological model to explain
what happened in Korea, Hinkle and Wolff utilize the
concept of homeostasis, in which an individual's environ

ment is in a state of equalibrium.

This equalibrium is not

only dependent on satisfying one's physical needs, such as

having a comfortable body tempsrature, adequate food, air,
and water intake, but also on one's psychological needs as

well.

This also includes satisfactory interaction with

122

L. E. Hinkle and H. G. Wolff, Communist

Interrogation and Indoctrination Of 'Enemies Of The

State'," AHA Archives Of Neurology And Psychiatry, 76
(1956): p. 168.
^
^
~~

52

others who are close in proximity.

Problems seem to arise

when one's equalibrium is upset, and man, taking the
natural course expected of him, attempts to restore this
12^

balance.

Some of the psycho-physiological techniques used by

the Chinese in Korea were: standing at attention for long
periods of time; being slapped Or kicked; being kept in
solitary confinement; being made to stand on toes with rope
around neck; and being made to stand in water.

124

In

experiments where individuals are placed in a situation

which produces disequalibrium, the individual does every

thing he can to relieve the stress he is going through.
This includes random exploration, in which one becomes
"excited, anxious, hyperactive, and panicy."

If the stress

is not satisfactorily relieved, he goes into an inactive,
dejected state.

In this state he becomes dependent upon

anyone who offers to help him.

In the FOW camp, it was one

of the Chinese Communists (usually an interrogator or

123

L. E. Hinkle and H. G. Wolff, "Communist

Interrogation And Indoctrination Of 'Enemies Of The

State'," pp. 168-169.
124

Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 112; Schein,
"The Chinese Indoctrination Program For Prisoners Of War,"
p. 162; The Army did not consider the above acts torture,
and equated them to the same type of stress a combat
soldier undergoes; see Kinkead, In Every War But One,
p. 112.'
^
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guard) who came to the prisoner's aid.

This gave the

prisoner the opportunity to talk, for he was in great need

of social interaction due to the breakdown of the group,
distrust of the other POWs, and from the ordeal he had just
gone through.

The prisoner was allowed to talk about

anything he wished, because this afforded the Communist the

opportunity to establish a good relationship with the

captive.

"Because of his dependence upon the interrogator,

the prisoner develops an intense desire to please him.

The

prisoner glows when he is rewarded, and is deeply disturbed
125

when he is rejected."

An example of this process has been cited on pages

43-44 of this thesis.

It showed that a POW looking for

social ties was aided by Chinese Communists who gave him
mail from home.

This would evoke a sense of trust in the

POW and it enabled them to exploit the prisoner under the
guise of friendship.

126

Another excellent example has been described by
Captain Zach W. Dean after his repatriation from the
Chinese.

After being taken on what was described as a

"death march". Dean was not only harassed by the Chinese

125 .

Hinkle and Wolff, "Communist Interrogation And

Indoctrination Of 'Enemies Of The State'," pp. 170-171.
126

Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 122.
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but he was also deprived of food and warmth.

When he felt

he Gould not hold oh any longer, the Communists went to

great lengths to revive him.

He was treated kindly, and

given food and adequate living accommodations.

After a few

weeks, he was again deprived of physical needs, harassed
and lectured on Communism, and left to die.
revived and nursed back to health.

Again he was

The effects of this

treatment are best expressed by Dean: "I don't believe

you'll be able to understand what I'm going to tell you

now.

After the Reds do that to you a few times, you are

grateful to them for saving your life.

You forget that
127

they are the people who almost killed you."

The Learning Theory Explanation

According to other writers, what took place in the
Chinese held.POW camps was the outcome of Ivan Pavlov's
work with dogs

128

Robert Merloo has suggested that in
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U.S. Cbngress, House, Communist Psychological
Warfare (Brainwashing), p. 17.
1 i28

Lifton, Thought Reform And The Psychology Of

Totalism, p. 3885 Robert Merloo, "Pavlovian Strategy As A
Weapon In Mentlcide," American Journal Of Psychiatry 110

(1954): p. 809; P. S. Santucci and G. Winokur, "Brain
washing As A Factor In Psychiatric Illness," AMA Archives
Of Neurology And Psychiatry 74 (1955): pp. 11-16; Sargant,
Battle For The Mind, pp. 29-45; Hunter, Brainwashing: From
Pavlov To Powers, pp. 17-41; (Hunter has even gone so far
as to state that a four hundred page secret manuscript
exists in the Kremlin in which results of extensive

research by Pavlov on human beings is compiled.)
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order for conditioning to have taken place in the POW

camps, two elements had to be present.

First, there had to

be the breakdown of the group, in which "old patterns have
to be broken down in order to build up conditioned
129

reflexes."

This was done by isolation, whereby

"feelings of terror, fear, and hopelessness, of being
alone, of standing with one's back to the wall" is the

outcome.

Secondly, "guilt must be aroused."

This was done

by interrogations, self-criticism statements, etc../*^*^
William Sargant agrees with Merloo and contends that, "Once
a state of hysteria has been induced in men or dogs by

mounting stresses which the brain can no longer tolerate,
protective inhibition is likely to supervene."

This is

seen to disturt) the individual's previously conditioned

behavior patterns, and leaves one increasingly susceptible
.

to suggestion.

131

The two types of conditioning mentioned

deal with the basic conditioning of reflexes and neurosis.
At the core of the classical conditioning process

is the learning of reflexes, which are "involuntary

responses elicited by a specific stimulus" (i.e., pulling

129

Merloo, The Rape Of The Mind, pp. 43-45.

130

Idem, "Pavlovian Strategy As A Weapon In
Menticide," p. 8II.

^^^Sargant, Battle For The Mind, p. 59.
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one's hand away from a hot stove).

In Pavlov's studies, a

dog was given food immediately after the flashing of a
light.

The dog's response to the food was the activation

of its salivary glands.

It was discovered that after

several pairings of the food with the light, the light
alone would elicit salivation.

1 Qp

In order that the

reader may better understand this process, the following
terms should be clarified:

1.

Unconditioned Stimulus (UCS)—Any
stimulus that regularly produces a
response.

2.

Unconditioned Response (UCR)--The
reaction to the UCS.

3.

Condition Stimulus (CS)—A neutral

stimulus that is paired with the UCS
which prior to the process does not
produce UCR.

4.

Conditioned Response(CR)—-After
several pairings with the UCS, the CS
begins to elicit the same reactions
as the UCS, making the response a
conditioned response (CR) or a learned

response.^
In a classical conditioning framework, a neutral
conditioned stimulus (CS) is paired with a non-neutral

stimulus (UCS) which produces a response (UCR).

After

several pairings of the conditioned stimulus (CS) and the

132

Gregory Eirable, Norman Garmezy, and Edward
Zigler, Principles Of General Psychology, Fourth Edition

(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1975), p. 209.

\^^lbid, pp. 209-219.
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unconditioned stimulus (UCS), the conditioned stimulus (CS)
has the ability to elicit a response resembling that of the

unconditioned response (UCR).

The reflex is therefore

learned or conditioned, and referred to as the conditioned
134

response (CR).

An example of the type of conditioning which took

place in North Korea is diagrammed as follows:
UCS

Food (or reward of
some sort)

-^-UCR

Favorable reaction
to Chinese

Slogans (propaganda

This shows that the food (UCS) is paired with slogans (CS).
The UCS emits a favorable reaction to the Chinese (UCR).

After several pairings, the slogans alone will elicit a
favorable response to the Chinese.

CS

Slogans

^CR

This is shown as:

Favorable reaction to Chinese

It is seen that the prisoners were conditioned to

equate a previous neutral stimulus to favorable reactions

to the Chinese by the POWs.

1 34

^ Ibid, p. 214.

Edward Hunter, after watching
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a film entitled The Nervous System.

1 "RS

in whieh Pavlov

himself conditions a man to salivate to a flash of light,
asked the following question to a psychiatrist with whom he
saw the movie:

Hunter:

"What if the person doesn't want
to react that way?"

Psychiatrist:

"He can't help it!
Nothing he can do can
stop his saliva glands

from working."^3d
In other words, once conditioned, the individual is power
less to do anything about it as long as the proper sequence
of reinforcement is used and other variables are not
introduced.

In other studies, Pavlov found that if a dog was

presented with food in temperal association with light, the
dog would salivate.

After conditioning the dog to salivate

to this circle of light, it was found that the dog would
not salivate if presented with an eclipse of light (and no

food).

In addition, the closer the eclipse came to repre

senting a whole circle, differentiation became harder for

the dog.

This conflict caused the dog to howl and become

excited, which has become known as an experimental

135

Edward Hunter claims he has seen two versions

of this film--one depicting experimentation on people and
one that deletes the experience.
13S

p. 26.

Hunter, Brainwashing: From Pavlov To Powers,
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neurosis,117 or confusion neurosis.118
^

This explanation

has also been used by P. S. Santuoci and G. Winokur to
account for how the prisoners were brainwashed in Korea.
Santucci and Winokur believe that there are three

types of conditioned responses,' and that behavior consists

not only of verbal activities, but of thinking and motor
activity as well.

In the POW camps, the prisoners were

forced into doing things that they did not wish to do (i.e.

sing Communist songs, and write statements).

By partici

pating, even though forced to do so, they were rewarded

for their behavior. "If, in the beginning, the patient^
did not believe in his statements and activities, there
would have inevitably been an internal conflict between his

motor and speech responses as opposed to thinking.

When put in this situation (described as a Catch 22 above),
a confusion neurosis was likely to ensue.

There are three

ways to care for this type of neurosis: try and outwit the

137
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G. Winokur, "Brainwashing: A Social Phenomenon

Of Our Time," Human Organization 13 (1955): p. 16.
118

Merloo, "Pavlovian strategy As A Weapon In
Menticide," p. 810.
139

■^•^Santucci and Winokur refer to the POWs as
patients throughout the article.
140

Santucci and Winokur, "Brainwashing As Factor
In Psychiatric Illness," p. 15.
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captors, refuse to do their bidding, or think and act as
they wish you to act.

Santucci and Winokur feel that the

latter of the three was the course of action that the POWs

in Korea took since it was the path of least resistance,
and, in addition, was where rewards instead of punishments
prevailed.

141

I. F. Farber, Harry F. Harlow, and Louis J. West

present a theoretical analysis of the psychological states

that were at work in Korea in their article, "Brainwashing,
Conditioning, and DDD (Debility, Dependency, and Dread)."
Although they did not go into great detail on the contrib
uting factors, they did recognize that "the effectiveness

of Communist methods was undoubtedly greatly enhanced by
their control of the means for satisfying nuclear social

needs for recognition, status, communication, and so on."
Therefore, what took place in the camps was possible due to
these social controls, which the author of this thesis
perceives as the breakdown of the group.

1 k?

Farber et al feel that the psychological states at

work in Korea consisted of debility, in which individuals

exposed to noxious stimulation, injury, malnutrition.

1 ill

'^'ibid, pp. 15-16.
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I. F. Farber, Harry F. Harlow, and Louis J.

West, "Brainwashing, Conditioning, And DDD (Debility,
Dependency, And Dread)," Sociometry 20 (1957), p. 273.
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deprivation, etc., were left in a weakened psyohological
state; dependency, in which they were dependent on the

Chinese for basic need satisfaction; and dread, which
14-5

consists of great fear and anxiety.

The manipulation

and use of these three factors had a two-fold effect.

First, it put the prisoner in a state in which he had

little response for what was going on around him.

This

tended to disrupt his sense of time and self-concept.
Second, his symbolic processes were affected, which has
been suggested could have made him susceptible to condi

tioning. aThis conditioning process, according to Farber ^
al. relies mainly on operant (instrumental) conditioning,
1421

although classical conditioning was also used.

The first thing the Communists did was to condition
the prisoner to believe that DDD could be alleviated.

(This was referred to as classically conditioning anticipa
tory goal response by Farber et al.)

Such expectancy of

relief served the purpose of keeping the prisoner's hopes
alive, whereas if he were totally broken down he would be

of no use to the Communists.

An example Of this can be

Seen in the case of the soldier who was instructed by the

Chinese to stand at attention for long hours or confined

^^^Ibid, ppv/ 272-273;
144

Ibid, pp.: 274-276.
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145

to the "hole"

for failure to cooperate.

The prisoner

was made aware that the reason for his predicament was

"self-inflicted."

If he wished his hardships to cease, all

he had to do was inform his captors of his willingness to
cooperate.

This served to increase the intensity of his

thoughts of relief, since he knew he had the ability to

alleviate his hardships.

146

Upon cooperating, operant

conditioning was a by-product (that is, what takes place
after a response determines whether that response will
persist—with emphasis on reinforcement

147

).

In the above

example, relief i'rom standing at attention or release from
the hole is a reinforcer.
threats, and contumely

148

Additionally, "interrogation,
may also have a rewarding aspect,

so great is the acquired reinforcement value of social

communication and speech under conditions of isolation.

145

The hole;was usually a small, tin box in which

the prisoner was deprived of food and water, and where
temperatures reached dangerous extremes.
146

Farber, et al., "Brainwashing, Conditioning,

And DDD (Debility, Dependency, And DreadX," pp. 276-277.
147

Robert E. Silverman, Psychology (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1975)j p. 456.
148

contumely—"insulting display of contempt in

words or actions; contemptuous or humiliating treatment;
see The Random House Dictionary Of The English Language,
s.v. "contumely."
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dependency, and debility."

DDD is thus seen to

encompass the ideas of Hinkle and Wolff, Pavlov, and
Skinner's operant conditioning as well.

The Socio-psychological Explanation

In response to this psycho-physiological explana

tion, Edgar Schein has stated that the physical hardships
and deprivations used in Korea were either attempts to
degrade and humiliate the prisoner or the result of
extenuating circumstances (Chinese inability to keep the

prisons supplied, anger of the guards, inspire fear in
1 jT n

others, etc.).

Schein sees a socio-psychological

explanation for the methods used in North Korea.

In his

article, "Interpersonal Communication, Group Solidarity,
and Social Influence," he uses many of the Sociologist
Erving Goffman's ideas in order to present a theory of
influence dealing with attitude and value change.

Schein

believes that groups and individuals are protected against

change or influence through an interpersonal communication
process.

This process includes social relationships,

roles, and self-images which are important to groups and

149

Farber et al., "Brainwashing, Conditioning,

And DDD (Debility, Dependency, And Dread)," p. 277.
150

Schein, "Reaction Patterns To Severe, Chronic
Stress In American Army Prisoners Of The Chinese," p. 29

"-f . ■
individual functioning.

■

^

He further believes that, "In*'

order for people to accomplish any kind of task together

they must have a certain level of regard for each other,
which is usually reflected in the.degree of attention they

give to each other...If such regard or involvement is
improperly low or high, it is a signal that the person can
not be trusted not-to take advantage of the other partici
151

pants in the situation."

With the breakdown of the

group in Korea, the regard and invo-lvement which POW's had
for each other was consequently very low.

The result was

that their opinions:.and beliefs, self-images, and fundamen
tal values became susceptabre to change.

reasons for this.

Schein gives two

First, with the breaking of old ties

within the group, .the POW was looking to regain those ties
or establish new ones.

Schein believes this could not

occur without "some personal change."

Secondly, having no

one with whom to compare beliefs and judgements, he became
susceptable to "cognitive re-definition."

By this Schein

means that "process of accepting new definitions for

existing concepts, placing concepts into new scales of
evaluation, or shifting the anchors or neutral points on

151

Edgar Schein, "Interpersonal Communication,
Group SoITdarity, and Socialvlnfluehce," Sociometry 23
(I960): p. 149.

such scalesJ??.Such re-definition might take the form of
not recognizing that his behavior was in fact helping the

enemy, or of re-evaluating relative priorities where
153

conflicting values were involved."

An example of this can be seen to have occurred

before the breakdown of the group had begun>

If one

recalls the fears that the soldier initially experienced

upon capture, it was shown that not long after falling into

the enemyls hands, a change in the individual's beliefs

took place.

Since he was not tortured or killed outright,

his prior attitudes and beliefs about the Chinese were

suddenly being questioned, and an Inevitable change
occurred in those beliefs.

154

Another example previously cited was about the

prisoner who was in distress because he had not received
any mail.

After talking with a sympathetic Communist

guard, the outcome was that the guard would bring him some

mail within a few days.

Consequently, a re-defining of the

prisoners beliefs took place, because the Communist guards

■ ■ 1 52

^ Ibid, p. 151.

^^^Ibid,^ p. l57.v.^^^^7^ V

rv
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Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
Prisoners Of War," pp. 150-151; Kinkead, In Every War But
One, p. 94.
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would be looked upon much more favorably.^
Further examples of cognitive re-definition as it

took place in the prisoner of war camps were as follows: a

confined officer would write a propaganda statement rather

than risk having all of his men shot; prisoners giving
information during an interrogation because they knew that
a fellow POW had already given the same information;
prisoners collaborating with the Communists in order that
a friend would be given medicine or that their families
'

would be notified that they were alive but prisoners.

1 "S6

The above examples support Schein's theory that
with the breakdown of the group (and in certain cases

before the brainwashing process began in the permanent

camps), the cognitive processes and existing beliefs are
thrown into a state of disequalibrium or dissonance.

Due

to this disruption of social ties, the individual's

beliefs, self-image, and social roles become subject to
change, because "forces against change are reduced or

removed" (group cohesion broken down); "motives toward

re-integration are induced" (ripe for influence); and

"cognitive re-definitions are facilitated" (change in
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Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 121-122.

156

Schein, "Interpersonal Communication, Group
Solidarity, And Social Influence," p. 157.
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beliefs, values, etc.).157

The Sociological Explanation

In the theories cited above, it was shown that the
methods employed by the Chinese were largely responsible

for the POW's brainwashing in Korea.

Furthermore, emphasis

was always placed on the breakdown in group cohesion as a

key factor in each of the theories presented.

Both William

E. Mayer, in an article in U.S. News & World Report, and

Eugene Kinkead, in his book. In Every War But One, submit

that the breakdown of the group was an important aspect in
the brainwashing process.

The methods used could not have

been successful they believe, if it was not for certain
1 JT Q

defects in American society.

These were seen in

three main areas: character development and discipline;
education; and military preparedness.

Regarding character development and discipline,
Mayer felt that many of the prisoners he interviewed and

studied

159

"had not been taught a sense of personal

^^"^Ibid, p. 158.
158

Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 154-157;
Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?,"pp. 60-64.
159

Major Mayer was (in 1956) a U.S. Army expert
on brainwashing. He bases his theory on interviews with

two hundred repatriated POWs and by studing approximately
eight hundred of the returnees records; see Mayer, "Why Did
Many GI Captives Cave In?," p. 56.
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responsibility for the welfare of others,"

He emphasized

that the Significant Others who were responsible for
instilling this in children failed in their duty.

1 ^n

Additionally, it was suggested by Major Clarence L.

Anderson, an Army doctor and prisoner in Korea, that the
POW's problems were the result not only of inadequate

socialization of the POWs, but of a "new softness" that
this lack of socialization induced.

161

This softness has

been attributed to "momism", with such dependence resulting
in passivity and imaturity in the young soldiers.

^ f\0

This

type of socialization was also reflected in the type of
education that the individual received.

In his discussion on education, Mayer not only

referred to the lack of basic education, but to an
educational system which did not stress the benefits and/or

difficulties of living in a democracy.

He also stated that

education should be directed toward each citize^n so that
each person becomes an active, responsible member of our
democratic society.

This advocated the revival of

patriotism, which was being looked upon at the time as

160

Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?,"

p. 60.
I-

.

Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 156.
1 62

Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?,"

p. 60-61.
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being foolish.

16^

With this type of breakdown in the

socialization process of our society, it is reasonable to
conclude problems would occur in the ranks of the U.S.

military, since the services drew its members from society.
In addition to the "inadequate socialization and

education" our young men received, the problems were
compounded by the results of the Dpolittle Board of 1945.
The purpose of the Doolittle Board was to deal with the

perceived inequities between the officer and enlisted
ranks.

As World War II had recently come to close, the

decisions of that board

were reached for two reasons.

First, the Army was planning its future around peace, and
second, the abuses of enlisted men by officers (which were

later the subject of many popular movies and books, i.e.
From Here To Eternity, The Caine Mutiny, etc.).

Therefore, in response to the social climate of the time,
two of the actions recommended by this board greatly

affected the Army and its discipline:
1.

The power of the Company Grade Officer
was perceived as being diminished,
particularly in the area of summary
court martial.

2.

The Inspector General (IG) system was
emphasized as a viable "complaint
department" for any soldier who felt

^^^Ibid, pp.: 61-62.
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he was wronged.

164

The effects of these two measures were seen by-

some as an extension of the problems in our society, by
fostering the breakdown of discipline.

They argued that

many officers felt stripped of their power, refused to be
responsible for the actions of their men, and would not

give unpopular orders.

The Noncommissioned officer, who

previously had been looked upon as a demi-god, saw that the
officers as well as themselves were without their past

status and authority.

Moreover, with the threat that

anyone could go over their heads to the Inspector General,
they were reluctant to enforce disciplinary measures which
might precipitate an investigation.

As a consequence, many

believe this policy was responsible for the "complete
165

gutting of discipline."

The effects of this "gutting of discipline" on

military preparedness was also explored.

It was suggested

that too much time was spent on the mechanical aspects of

164

The summary court martial is, "The lowest
of three types of courts-martial. It consists of one
commissioned officer who acts as judge, jury, trial
counsel, and defense counsel (unless the accused is repre
sented by a separate counsel)"; see Edward M. Byrne,

Military Law (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981),
756; Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 175-176.

^^^Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 174-178.

TX

war rather than on human ones.

1^

The Army was referred to

as a "riding Army" which, when vehicles broke down, the

soldier, accustomed to riding, was ineffective on foot.
With the emphasis on mechanized armies in modern warfare,
discipline suffered the same breakdown as the vehicles.

16T

Thus, according to Mayer and Kinkead, the Army was supplied
and influenced by a society which did not properly
socialize its members.

The Army fielded in Korea was not

only weak in moral Character, education, and preparedness,

but it was also lacking in the discipline needed in battle.
When taken prisoner, the soldiers were ill-prepared for the
ordeals they encountered.

In contrast, perhaps one might use the following
summary of the Turkish soldier's resistance to brainwashing

in Korea.

Of the roughly 6,000 United Nations soldiers

captured by Communist forces, 229 of them were Turkish.
the cessation of hostilities, all 229 Turkish prisoners

were repatriated during Operation Big Switch.

168

Eugene

Kinkead and William Mayer indicate that the Turks were
subjected to the same brainwashing process and living

166

Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?,"

p. 60.
167

Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 173.

^^^Ibid,: pp. 164-165

At
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oonditions as the other U.N. prisoners, yet they held up

very well---all 229 captured were repatriated, all resisted

indoctrination, and only two collaborated (and were
ostraci2ed)--even though specifically targeted for indoc
trination.

Their success stemmed from their adherence to

military organization and discipline, which resisted all
169

attempts to break down the group.

A Turkish officer

stated: "I told the Chinese Commander of the camp that

while we were a unit, I was in charge of my group...If he
wanted anything done, he was to come to see me, and I would
see that it was done.

When he removed me, the responsi

bility would fall not on him, but on the man next below me,
and after that on the man below him.

And so on, down

through the ranks, until there were only two privates
170

left."

Moreover, it was found that if a man was too

sick or wounded to care for himself, men were assigned to
nurse him back to health; oftentimes this required bathing
and spoon-feeding the patient.

171

the Turks pretty
well flouted
their
Chinese captors. They

According to Kinkead:
the authority of
broke rules and
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Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?,"

p. 58; Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 165-168.
170

Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 166.

171

p. 58.

Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?,"
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often refused
to obey ostensibly reasonable
requests. They simply declined to cooperate, and
eventually the Communists left them alone. It
was generally believed that the Chinese feared
the Turks to some degree because they stuck
together as a group and resisted as a group.
Their discipline and
military organization saw
them through as prisoners with no fatalities and

virtually no indoctrination.''72
The successful resistance to the breakdown

of the

group was therefore seen as the reason that the Turks

fared so well in the POW camps.

This would, in Mayer and

Kinkead's viewpoint, be attributed to the solidity of their
socialization process and in their society in general.
There are other cases of similar actions by U.S. service

men,

173

however, the Turkish viewpoint was presented due

to the number involved and their continued effectiveness at

thwarting the Chinese's attempts to brainwash them.

The Eclectic Explanation

Albert Somit has submitted an eclectic explanation

for the processes at work in brainwashing.

He stated that,

"There is now also general agreement that the techniques
was not the outgrowth of a consistent or even conscious

adherence to any single school."

He believed that there

1 72

Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 168.
173

Biderman, March To Calumny, pp. 58-61;
Kinkead, In Every War But On'^ p"^ 169
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are ten mechanisms in the brainwashing process.

They are

as follows:

1.

Identification--Due to isolation, the
prisoner will try to find someone to
identify with in order to establish
social ties. The likely candidate is
an interrogator, in which emotional
involvement becomes an important
aspect in the prisoners capitulation.

2.

Decrease Of Intellectual Capacity—Due

to physical and mental exhaustion,
the prisoner is unable to think
effectively.

3.

Disorientation Arising From Solitary
Confinement—When confined alone for a

long period of time, the prisoner is
in need of interaction.

This can

lead to a "stimulus hunger," in which
the prisoner becomes susceptible to
suggestion.

4.

Suggestion—With great stresses put
on the prisoner, the individual's
mental conditions are weakened.

He

is then subject to suggestion.

5.

Repetition—-With constant repetition,
any message is likely to get through
defenses, especially those that are
credible.

6.

Guilt Feeling—These are aroused by
having the prisoner reflect on past
bad deeds. Once these are brought to

light, these deeds are use(^ against
the individual to undermine resistance.

7.

Ego Destruction—The humiliation and

degradation the prisoner goes through
results in the loss of self-esteem.

This affects the prisoners ability to
resist.

8.

Conditioned Behavior—Somit sees this
as a matter of controversy, but
concedes that, "there is no question.
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however, that the deliberate relating
of punishment and reward to progress
or the lack of progress is one way of
'conditioning' the prisoner to make the
type of response desired."
9.

Nonrational Behavior In The Face Of
Sudden Stimulus—Prisoners who are

suddenly subjected to an unexpected,
overwhelming stimulus are not seen to
be able to resist for long.
10.

Alternation Of Fear And Hope—

Although the prisoners are treated
poorly, the captors insinuate that
there is a better life ahead

that cooperate.

for those

This keeps the

prisoners from completely giving up,

leaving them open for exploitation. ^
Although Somit makes a weak case for the breakdown

of the group, it should be noted that his explanation
refers mainly to the brainwashing of individuals, which
differs slightly from that of groups.

The difference is

that, with individuals, the prisoner is isolated from the
start due to the fact that he is alone in

his ordeal.

In a

group setting, however, the group must be broken down prior
to the isolation.

It is this writer's opinion that had

Somit expanded his summary to include the brainwashing of
groups, he would have highlighted this point.

In summary, it should be emphasized that the
purpose of presenting the above theories was not to imply
that one was more applicable than another in explaining

174
International Encyclopedia Of The Social

Sciences, 196b ed., s.v. "brainwashing," by Albert Somit.
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what took place during the brainwashing process in Korea.

The purpose was to show that no matter what school of

thought came in to play regarding these theoretical aspects
of brainwashing, one key factor clearly stood out--the
breakdown of group cohesion.
The effectiveness of Chinese brainwashing will be
discussed in the following chapter.

V.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BRAINWASHING PROCESS

Approximately one month after the first group of

Americans landed in Korea, an article entitled "The FLA
Policy For War Prisoners" was published in People's China,

a Communist magazine.

The article dealt with the success

that the Chinese Communist's experienced in the "antiJapanese Wars" as well as during the revolution in winning

over their enemies, mainly because of their treatment of
prisoners.

This poicy included lenient treatment, separa

tion of officers from enlisted, lectures and discussions
about China, and "accusation meetings," where the prisoners
discussed the suffering they experienced under their

governments.

,

The Chinese objectives were "to win them

[POWs] over, re-educate them, and gradually remould their
ideology and behavior."

Even if they could not be re

educated in such a short time, two or three months was
sufficient "to make them politically neutral.

Such persons

were no longer willing to risk their lives for a lost
1 75

cause."

The importance of Chiu Kang's article is two-fold:

first, many writers on the subject of brainwashing have

175

Chiu Kang, "The PLA Policy For War Prisoners,"

People's China, 1 August, 1950, pp. 8-9.

■ 78
stated that ideologleal remoulding was the Chinese

objective of brainwashing.

1 T6

(This was also admitted

by the Chinese in this same article prior to their entrance
into the Korean War.)

Second, their success was measured

by the degree of ideological change and/or neutralization
in the prisoner's behavior.

The extent of ideological change which took place

in Korea, according to Edgar Schein, "is difficult to
evaluate because of the...hazards in measuring ideological

change, and because of the impossibility of determining the
177

latent effects of the indoctrination."

It seems,

however, that twenty-one American prisoners capitulated to
the brainwashing techniques of their captors.

Virginia

Pasley has suggested that this number would have been much
larger had it not been for a twist of fate.

She contends

that approximately one hundred days prior to the armistice

1 T6

Biderman, March To Calumny, p. 70; Hunter,
Brainwashing; From Pavlov to Powers, p. 50; Pasley, 21
Stayed, pp. 236-237; Scheflin, The Mind Manipulators,
p. by; Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For

Prisoners Of War," p. 169; Henry Ai Segal, "Initial
Psychiatric Findings Of Recently Repatriated Prisoners

Of War," American Journal Of Psychiatry 111 (1954):
358; Peter Watson,: War On The Mind (N^ York; Basic
Books, Inc., 1978), p. 288.
'1-77 ■ '

■ ■;'

Schein, '^The Chinese Indoctrination Program For

Prisoners Of War," p. 169. ;

^ ^^ ^

^
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being signed,1TS the Chinese returned (in Operation Little

Switch) 149 prisoners to United Nation's control.

They

consisted of the sick and wounded, as well as "progres

sives" who were planted to spread Communist propaganda in

the United States.

Sixty days after they were returned,

the Chinese learned that almost fifteen thousand Chinese

prisoners of the United Nations refused to return home.

This came as a shock to the Chinese, who felt that in
response they had to have some American prisoners refuse
repatriation.

They therefore had only forty days to

"develop a token force to keep back and had to pick those
whom their methods would soften up most quickly."

The

group they had to pick from was depleted from their most

advanced progressives, due to their sending them off
prematurely.

179

If the Chinese had the foresight to hold

off sending back to the States the progressives during
Operation Little Switch, it is probable that they would
have kept them in China.

Edgar Schein believes that the

main reason these twenty-one refused repartiation was not

due to a change in ideology, but from fear of the charges
that would be brought against them for misconduct upon

1T8

See Appendix 6 for Korean War Chronology.

170

'^Palsey, 21 Stayed, p. 228.
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theiri return to the United States.

It would

therefore follow that the methods used "to soften" the

twenty-one who stayed highlighted this fact.
In view of the fact that only twenty-one Americans

stayed with the Chinese

182

compared to the 14,704

Chinese who stayed with the United Nations forces, Schein
believes that "In terms of overt criteria of conversion or

ideological change, one can only conclude that, considering
the effort devoted to it, the Chinese program was a
18^

failure."

This Conclusion is widely accepted by

many other writers on this topic as well.

184

It was.

iftn

Schein, "The, Chinese Indoctrination Program For
Prisoners Of War," p. 165.
181

The main reason the 14,704 Chinese prisoners
decided to stay with the West was due to successful indoc
trination by the United States, and not due to fear of
charges being brought against them. The success of U.S*
indoctrination centered on kind treatment of their Chinese

(and North Korean) prisoners. The main difference between
brainwashing and indoctrination is that brainwashing uses
violence and aggressiveness as its basis, while indoctri
nation uses kind treatment; see White, The Captives Of

Korea, pp. 111-117.

^^^As of 1978, "fewer than ten" have failed to
return; see Scheflin, The Mind Manipulators, p. 89.
i GO

:

Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
Prisoners Of War," p. 169.
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Biderman, March To. Calumny, pp. 74-75;
Scheflin, The Mind Manipulators, p. 89; Segal, "Initial

V-y.

as in BidermanVs words, "a resounding flop."''^^
Since the Chinese were, for the most part, not as
effective as they would have liked their brainwashing of

American POWs to be in terms of ideological conversibn, it
would seem that American concern pVer brainwashing would
end.

The reason it did not, however, was due to some in

teresting incidents which took place in the POW camps.

The

general public (with the help of the media), claimed that
these incidents were the result of successful brainwashing.

The most significant charges were that one out of every
three prisoners collaborated, with one out of every seven

collaborating seriously.

Moreover, not one prisoner es

caped from a permanent camp and the death rate among pris
oners was higher than any war in our nation's history.

1 8fi

After repatriationj the U.S. Army conducted
extensive Studies on the returnees which centered around

psychiatric evaluations and counterintelligence.^^'^
Subsequently, individuals were placed Into three categories

Psychiatric Findings Of Recently Repatriated Prisoners Of
War,;", p.. 363. .,' ;

Biderman, March To Calumny, pp. 74-75.
Klnkead, In Every War But One v pp. 16-17;
U.S. Congress, House, Communist Psychological Warfare

(Brainwashing

p. 15.

^^"^Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 40-41.

'' ■

■;^ ' ■ •

"' 82

aeeordlng to their oonduot while captives: participators

(also known as proVs and progressives), resisters, or
middle men (also known as neutrals).

PartiGipators^-Fifteen per

cent of

the men fell

in thisrosrtial.
catagory.'
were men discharge...plus
recorome
court
; pr Thdse
dishonorable

those
who would have fallen In either category
hed they not already been discharged from the
military service^

Resisters—Five per cent of
category.
These
were
recommended for

the men fell in this
who
were

decoration as

a result of their

meritorious behavior in captivity, plus those who
committed
at
least
two
distinct acts of
resistance in internment and against whom there
was no derogatory information.

Middle Men—.Eighty per

cent of the men

fell in

this category. These were men...whom the Army
had compiled little or no derogatory information,
or conflicting information.188

The two groups who were of most cpoeern to the Army beGause
of collaboration wdre the "participators" and the "middle
.fmen.'" ;■

As stated earlier, collaboration on the part of the

prisoners Was reportedly widespread. Most charges were
based on acts such as filling out phoney Red Cross forms or

signing peace petitions. A smaller nufflber of individuals,
referred to as partleipators, "engaged in persistent

collaboration which included writing, signing, and

soliciting signatures for peace petitions, delivering
188^ ■'

Segal, "Correlates Of Collaboration And

Resistance Behavior Among U.S. Army POWs In Korea," p. 32
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anti-United Nations lectures to other POWs, aiding in the

preparation and distribution of communist (sic) propaganda,
encouraging fellow POWs to collaborate, informing on other

POWs, and generally aiding the Chinese in their indoctri
189

nation program."

The above quote is similar to the

definition of collaboration found in The Random House

Dictionary Of The English Language, which is, "to cooper
190

ate, esp. willingly, with an enemy of one's country."

Based on this definition, it is interesting to note that

out of the 3,973 Army POWs repatriated, 425 were initially
considered for court-martial, but only forty-seven were

officially slated for court-martial.

Of these forty-seven,

fourteen were brought to trial but only ten were found
191/19?

guilty. ^

.

Additionally, it should be pointed out that

another group of 210 POWs were discharged prior to their
being charged for their actions in the camps.

Conse

quently, they were out of the Army's jurisdiction, but not
out of the jurisdiction of the. Department of Justice.

189

Edgar Schein, "Distinguishing Characteristics
Of Collaboration And Resistance Among American Prisoners Of

War," Journal Of Abnormal Psychology 55 (1958), p. 197.
190

The Random House Dictionary Of the English

Language, Unab. ed., (1971), s.v. "collaboration." ~
191

See Appendix 4, Table 3 for comparisons

between the services regarding collaboration.
192

Biderman, March To Calumny, p. 36.
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After studying the matter for several years however, the

Department of Justice decided to take no action against
IQO

these men.

The reason for this is two-fold; first,

the subject was not very popular with the public since they

perceived the enlisted man as getting stiffen sentences
than thoses received by the officers during the Army

trials.

194

And second, many years had passed since

their repatriation,, and m^ich time, :money, and effort would
■ '

■

,

,

-v,

be wasted trying to locate all the people involved in these

cases.

Moreover, It Was also likely that much relevant

information would have been forgotten.

195

Thus, even

if the trials did take place, few, if any, would have been

convicted.

Officially, based on legal criteria, "only 10
196

of 4,000 have been proven guilty of 'collaboration.'"

Such a low number should not have caused such great alarm.

Julius Segal, in addressing the neutralization of
the "middle men," has stated that although they did not
collaborate, they did not resist the Chinese either.

What

took place was that when confronted with the stresses of

193

Kinkead, March To Calumny, p. 75.

194_.

.p

Ibid, p. 68.

^^^Ibid, p. 75.
196

Biderman, March To Calumny, p. 37.
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prison camp life, they withdrew from the situation.

In so

doing, they were not a threat to the Chinese, and were
easy to control

In addition, they showed the

Communists that they did not care enough about America
and/or their duty as soldiers to continue the war while

prisoners. Such behavior, Segal believes, was a victory

for the Communists (as they themselves so claimed^

, and

further stated it was "an indictment of the American's own

indoctrination of its men."^^^
Historically, it would be safe to state that in

all wars, some POWs collaborated with their enemy.

For

example, it was found that during the Civil War, approxi
mately 3,170 Union soldiers went over to the Confederate

side, and abopt 5,450 Confederates went over to the Union's
side.

There were instances not only of collaboration with

the enemy, but also of what might be referred to as

"traitorous actions." In one case, a whole company of
"reconstructed" Confederate soldiers was sent to man a

197

Strassman, Thaler, and Schein agree with Segal
on this matter, and go into greater detail on the subject
in, "A Prisoner Of War Syndrome: Apathy As A Reaction To
Severe Stress;" see Harvey D. Strassman, Margaret B.
Thaler, and Edgar H. Schein, "A Prisoner Of War Syndrome:
Apathy As A Reaction To Severe Stress," American Journal
Of Psychiatry 112 (1954): 998-1003.
198

~

Kang, "The PLA Policy For War Prisoners," p. 8,

199

Watson, War On The Mind, p. 297.

,
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Union outpost so that those soldiers could be sent to fight
the South on an important front.

During World War II,

the policy was that after giving name, rank, and serial
201

number, the soldier was to "maintain silence."

let in

testimony to the Department of Uustice in 19''19, Hanns
Scharff, referred to as the "Luftwaffe's Master Interroga
tor,"

claimed that in his years as an interrogator

at AusWerstelle West, Oberursel, Germany, he interviewed
over five hundred downed airmen.

From these interroga

tiohs, he reported that he obtained the precise information
208

he wanted from "all but a handful."

Although his

techniques were somewhat different than the brainwashing
204

that took place in Korea,

the facts still remain:

^^^U.S., Secretary Of Defense, POW: The Fight
Continues After The Battle, p. 51.

201^., . ,
c:a
Ibid, p. 59.
202

Raymond F. Toliver, The Interrogator: The
Story Of Hanns Scharff, Luftwaffe's Master Interrogator

(Fallbrook: Aero Books, 197b).

~

.

~~~

20^

U.S., Secretary Of Defense, POW: The Fight

Continues After The Battle, p. 59.
204

Hanns Scharff mainly relied on friendliness,
with his main approaches being the "walking conference" and
the "deception" techniques (see Appendix 5). I would also
submit that a "consciousness of kind" was working in his
favor also, as he was Anglo and spoke perfect English, with
no accent. See Toliver, The Interrogator: The Story Of
Hanns Scharff, Luftwaffe's Master Interrogator, pp. 62-113.
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American POWs in the examples cited above, gave information
to the enemy.

Therefore, since collaboration and misconduct by

prisoners has always occurred in war, what took place in
Korea should not be cause for undue concern.

What should

be of more concern is that ninety-five percent of the

prisoners were neutralized by the Chinese brainwashing

techniques.205

This result was largely due to the

breakdown of the group.

Had the prisoners banded together,

they would have,made a formidable force behind the wire (as

were the Turks).

Since they did not do this, it enabled

the development of participators and middle men who failed

in their duties ^s soldiers and Americans.
Another factor which caused considerable criticism

was the fact that not one prisoner escaped from a permanent
Korean prisoner of war camp.

Had the facts been fully

known, the public would have realized that any escape would
have had to overcome many serious obstacles in order to

make his way back to friendly lines.

Earlier in this paper, it was stated that it would

have been easy for a prisoner to escape from his captors in

205

The ninety-five percent includes not only the
middle men, but the participators as well. The reason for
including the participators in this percentage is that in
order to collaborate, they first had to be successfully
neutralized.
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the permanent camp since he was usually not guarded or
or\f\/ocsT

securely confined.

The first steps then, in order

to escape, would be to avoid having the Chinese know of

one's plan through an informer, and to overcome the fear of
being recaptured by the North Koreans, whose treatment of
American prisoners was found to be brutal.

Assuming that

these obstacles were overcome, the next problem would be
the great distance one would have to travel to reach

friendly lines.

This distance could be anywhere from two

hundred to three hundred miles^ (the journey most likely

would be on foot208)j by one who probably was in a severely
weakened physical condition.

The journey, moreover, would

consist of travel through narrow valleys, which was charac

teristic of the terrain, and crawling with Chinese or North
Korean soldiers.

Perhaps the greatest problem one would

have to overcome was the disguising of one's features.

206„

It

oo ->0

See pp. 32-33.
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Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
Prisoners Of War," p. 152.
208

Biderman has stated that, "The situation was

quite different from that of previous wars in that the only
routes home in Korea were the seas or the fighting line...
There was no neutral shipping tied up in the ports of North
Korea; in fact, there were no ports left to speak of, so
that even this difficult but time-honored opening for
escape was closed to the Korean POW's."; see Biderman,

March To Calumny, p. 87.
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would be extremely hard to disguise oneself as an Oriental,
especially if a Negro.

And lastly, if by some stroke of

luck the front lines were reached, the POW would still have

to execute the very dangerous passage through the lines.
With the daily changing of passwords, it is impossible for
a POW to know the proper countersign to a challenge, and
'
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would risk being shot by his own forces.

^

Albert Biderman has compared the above circum

stances to those of the German soldiers who were prisoners

in the United States during World War II.

There were

435,788 German POWs interned in the United States at this
time, and only twenty eight escaped.

These were not

considered successful escapes however, since none of them
could get out of the country.

After the cessation of

hostilities, all were found living in the United States
under assumed names.

The only reason these escapes were

successful was because they could pass as Americans with
210

little difficulty.

Relating this to the predicament of

the prisoners in Korea who found themselves in an obviously

different environment, the American PGWs had little, if any
hope for escape.
In his discussion on the deaths of American

^^^Ibid, pp. 86-88.
^^°Ibid, pp. 89-90.

90

prisoners Eugene Kinkead found that 2,320 of the 7,190 POWs
held in captivity died in Korea.

This was described as "a

higher prisoner death rate than that of any of our previous
211

wars."

Oddly enough, contrary to past wars where the

captor's barbaric treatment of prisoners was given as the

reason for prisoner deaths, in Korea, the fault was put on
the prisoners.

Biderraan, in reaction to this has stated:

"The logic of regarding the victim rather than the perpe

trator of the submarginal conditions in Korea as 'primarily

responsible' for the high death rate...is like saying that
the mugging victim is respdnslble for the injuries and
losses he suffers because he does not have the strength

or training in judo to fight off his attacker."

Thus,

although the press and some writers fault the POWs for the

high number of deaths, the truth of the matter is that the
conditions they were forced to endure caused most of the
212
deaths.

in response to the accusation that the high death

rate should be a matter of concern, Biderman noted that in

Korea, most of the POWs who died, did so during the first
213

year of the war.

211

He then compared the death rates

Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 17.

212

Biderman, March To Calumny, p. 92.

213

See Appendix 4 for Tables.
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^

^
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during the first year of imprisonment of American PGWs in
Korea with the first year of imprisonment of American POWs
in World War II.

His data shows that the death rates were

high for both groups.

In Korea, thirty-eight percent of

the POWs died during the first year of the war, whereas

in World War II, sixty percent (1,492 out of 2,200 U.S.
prisoners) died in six weeks at Camp O'Donhel in the
214

Philippines while captives of the Japanese.

In view of the hbove statiStiGS, tj^e seemingly high
death rate for Korea was not different than the death rates

of prisoners held by the Japanese.

The Korean death rates

can be seen as a consequence of brainwashing, but it should

not be attributed to the effectiveness of the process,
since the Chinese were not out to kill the prisoners; they

merely wished to change their thinking about the war and
Communism.

Dr. Harold G. Wolff, who researched the subject of

brainwashing for the Central Intelligence Agency, summed
up the Korean POW experience as follows: "The behavior
of American prisoners of war...was in general not very

different from that of other armies and places, but was
obviously made to appear much worse by the enemy is propa

ganda devices and our own initital ineptitude in countering

214

Biderman, March To Calumny, p. 102.
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215

enemy propaganda."

By failing to counter this

propaganda, a brainwashing scare was used as a scapegoat to
rationalize what took place in the Korean prisoner of war

camps.

Since brainwashing was something new and mysterious

to the West, it was used to label anything that could not
be easily explained.

This eventually led to the formation

of a committee in 1955 by the Secretary of Defense to

investigate what went on in the POW camps.

The responsi

bility of this committee was to establish specific guide

lines for FOWs (and for soldiers in general) to abide by in
future wars.

On July 29th, 1955, the above mentioned committee
published its findings and recommendations.

They concluded

that, "Although all services had regulations, the U.S.
Armed Forces have never had a clearly defined code of

conduct applicable to American prisoners after capture.
There are piece-meal legal restrictions and regulations but
21 6

no comprehensive codification."

Consequently, the

World War II policy of "name, rank, and service number" was
carried

into the Korean

217
War.

The official consensus

215

Scheflin, The Mind Manipulators, p. 89.

O *1 fs

U.S., Secretary Of Defense, POW; The Fight

Continues After The Battle, pp. v-vii, "5"!
217

Modifications of this code took place during the
Korean War. The Army's modification was that a prisoner
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of the.committee was that only a "minority" of the POWs
were guilty of misconduct in Korea.

However, the members

felt that a code of conduct would be helpful to POWs in the
future.

In addition to the code, "each member of the Armed

Forces liable to capture must be provided with specific
training designed to equip him better to cope with all
enemy efforts against him.

He will be fully instructed as

to his behavior and obllga,tions in combat and in the event
O "1 R

of capture.

'"

On August 17, 1955, Executive Order

10631, A Code Of Conduct For Members Of The Armed Forces Of
The United States, was signed by President Dwight D.
219

Eisenhower.

In this writer's opinion, two important

guidelines resulting from the brainwashing of U.S. Army

prisoners in Korea are contained in this code: first,
maintain group cohesion, and second, do not give up the
fight once captured.

The promulgation of this executive

order officially closed all matters pertaining to the

did not have to stop at "name, rank, and service number"
as long as military information was not given. (No over
whelming evidence of violations of this code was found

in this writer's research.)

See Biderman, March To

Calumny, pp. 232-233.
p 18

U.S., Secretary Of Defense, POW: The Fight
Continues After The Battle, pp. 19, 25.
21Q

Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 19-20.
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Korean prisoner of war ordeal, and also focused on the
future conduct of all U.S. servicemen during wartime.

rules regulating one's conduct are listed below:

■

I

CODE OF COMDUCT

:

The Articles V

1. I am an American fighting man. I serve in
the forces which guard my country and our way of
life. I am prepared to give my life in their
.defense..- ,

2. I will never surrender 6f my own free will.
If in command, I will never surrender my men
while they still have the means to resist.
3. If I am captured I will continue to resist by
all means available. I will make every effort to
escape and aid others to escape.
I will accept
neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

4.
If I become a prisoner of
faith with my fellow prisoners.
information
nor take part in
might be harmful to my comrades.
I will take command.
If not,
lawful orders of those appointed

war, I will keep
I will give no
any action which
If I am senior,
I will obey the
over me and will

back them up In every way.

5.
of

When questioned, should I become a prisoner
war, I am bound to give only name, rank,

service number and date

of birth.

I will evade

answering further questions to the utmost of my
ability.
I will make
no oral or written
statements disloyal to my country and its allies
or harmful to their cause.

6.

I will

never forget

that I

am an American

fighting man, responsible for my actions, and
dedicated to the principles which made my country

free.

I will trusfepnin my God and

States Of America.

^^°Ibid, p. 40.

in the United

The

VI. CONCLUSION

When Mao Tse-Tung became the Chairman of the

Chinese Communist Party in 1949, he re-emphasized that the
breakdown of the group was essentia:!. in order for the
Communists to gain control of the masses.

This theory was

put into actual practice during the Civil War in China
between the Chinese Communists and Chiang K'ai-shek's
Nationalists and during the Korean War against the American
Army personnel captured by the Chinese Communists.

The U.S. Army went to war in Korea in response to

the June 25, 1950 invasion of South Korea by North Korea.

The American soldiers were mentally unprepared for the
conflict because they were mostly untrained soldiers of a

peace-time era thrown into battle with little, if any,
information about their foe or reasons why the U.S. was

fighting in Korea.

Consequently, with the entrance of

China into the war, those soldiers captured by the Chinese
were susceptible to brainwashing.

Furthermore, they were

not fore-warned of China's techniques of brainwashing and
what they entailed.

It was not until the repatriation of

the POW's that the brainwashing process received widespread
attention.

The key factor in the Chinese's success in brain

washing Army prisoners lay in their ability to break down
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the group's cohesion.

Various interpretations and examples

of their methods were presented.

All were shown to have

merit and all emphasized the breakdown of group cohesion as
the key factor in brainwashing.
It was shown that the American POWs fared

in Korea than American POW's of past wars.

no worse

Furthermore,

the brainwashing scare that follov/ed the repatriation of
the prisoners was intensified by the false perception the
public had of a mysterious oriental process which the

prisoners were thought to have been subjected to.
The Chinese's success in terms of ideological

conversion was extremely limited, since only twenty-one
Americans stayed with their captors.

It was suggested that

these men probably remained in China because they believed

that charges would be brought against them for misconduct
when they returned.

In terms of social control, it was

concluded that the Communists were quite effective since

ninety-five percent of the American POWs were successfully
neutralized and did not continue to fight once behind the

wire.

It is this writer's opinion that the Chinese brain

washing program came to an end not only because the

prisoner lists were exchanged (as Dixon claimed), but also
because they could see the results of their program.

Even

though there were few (if any) conversions, the enormous
success in controlling the prisoners made the brainwashing
program worth the Chinese's effort.

With almost total
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social control, there was no need to expend any more
effort.

Thus the program came to an end.

In Edgar Schein's summary of the brainwashing
process used by the Chinese in Korea, he stated that there
was an "attempt to use a combination of...techniques and
apply them simultaneously in order to gain complete control
over significant portions of the physical and social
221

environment of a group of people."

The Communists

gained control of the prisoner population by destroying

their group cohesion.

In responsb to their predicament,

the POWs became passive and inactive.

The outcpme of the Korean PGW experience, particu
larly in light of the inaction" by the majority of the

prisoners, prompted an investigative committee to be
formed by the Secretary of Defense.
■i

'

■

'

•

'

' ■

'

It recommended a Code

■

of Conduot to be used as a giiide for all members of the
Armed Forces.

The code stipulates how soldiers must behave

if they become prisoners.

Had this code been written and

adopted earlier, it could have alleviated many of the
problems which occurred in Korea.

The most important

statements in the code which pertain to group cohesion

were: (1) "I will continue to resist by all means avail
able;" (2) "I will accept neither parole nor special favors

221

Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
Prisoners Of War," p. 172.

; -
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from the enemy;" (3) "I will keep faith in my fellow

prisoners and give no information nor take part in any

action which might be harmful to my comrades;" (4) "If I am
senior, I will take command.

If not I will obey the lawful

orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in

every way;" and (5) "I will make no oral or written state
ment disloyal to my country

The code also stressed the

reason why the soldier should resist the enemy:

"I will

never forget that I am an American fighting man, respon

sible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which
made my country free.

I will trust in my God and in the
222

United States of America."

The soldier is therefore

compelled to follow the code in order to help preserve the

group's solidarity and our country's values.

In conclusion, future U.S. Army POW's Captured by
Communist forces will probably be treated in the same
manner as the Korean War FOWs.

The first step to counter

this treatment was taken when the Code Of Conduct was

implemented.

The second step is taking place today.

The

U.S. Army is testing the "Regimental Concept," in which
soldiers will spend their entire Army career with the same

regiment.

In as early as 1959, it was submitted that such

222

U.S., Secretary Of Defense, POW: The Fight
Continues After The Battle, p. 40.
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a program would be needed to develop and maintain group
cohesion in the U.S. Army.

The rationale is that it "will

enable a soldier to identify more strongly with those men

immediately around him, and, as a result, greatly increase
his loyalty to them.

The unit should thus be more effec

tive in combat, and, if any of its members are captured,

they should, through this group solidarity, be more able—•
as were the Turks and Marines—to resist pressure in a
22^

prison camp."

In the final analysis, brainwashing

would not be effective if one's bond to his group is
strong.

^^^Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 202-203.

APPENDIX 1 (Propaganda Leaflets Used By The Chinese And
Americans In The Korean War)

The following are actual Korean
Era
which
were
professionally reproduced

thesis. The originals were
and
yellowed
with age.

of newspaper quality
Source: Charles J.

Nilsson, (LTC, Ret), Assistant
Division, Korea, 1950-1951.
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leaflets
for this

G-3, 2nd Infantry

Leaflet Given As Safe Conduct Pass For 2nd Infantry

Division Men Capture By The Chinese And Released

Side

1

What Is She Thinking NOW?
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''CrM,
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7

TO LIVE
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FOR
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»i»

nmVt filiS

this
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(lf«r

THEN WHAT?

o«l)

Say

htV To w

Shong

You'll no lo

( «uiT'<u<l<>'')

low rkyair* with tkow. Shof*« rhymo# wIlW loog.
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Communist Leaflets Disseminated In South Korea (Originated
In POW Camp)

I appeal to you as a p.o.w.

: My fellow Officers and Men of the U.S. Army!
I am a U.S. pow of the people's Army and have
been

treated

with the utmost care.

We have no

reason to fight these peoples as they are trying
to unify the country as one nation. Korean
people want to have peace so the only way for
them to have it is for all foreign troops to
withdraw from the Korean soil.

As soon

as the troops withdraw from the Korean
soil all the P.O.W.s can go back to their
sweet

home.

Please Fellow! Give up your guns!
And surrender to the people's army'or
withdraw from Korea so you may go
your families and wives.
pvt Charles R. Kirtler

Co G 38 Inf Regt.
2nd

C-^

/-^ /y 0

CkA ^yj- •'ta^T^
oXj2.

Inf Div

/p. o. (xJ.'o

6"-^

C—
■j
Side
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Communist Leaflet Disseminated in South Korea (Originated

In POW Camp)
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like
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Mwdd!

'
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cleatix s dcvir oil) . l-'n San and Cl.iu-Ilai the liUaations »jf which an?
only a fivicstion tu time.

On the imxintains, the partisans 2Lrc wailing for yon. And in the
CcVls als-j the

of Korea are watching for you.

S p;*">eyr >ou oouldi escape to live end I

The hi;;h waves running loiigh of Uio korcAn Straits will watiih your
retrr.'K

\\hci^ver yixi nvay try to ci^ipe you can iwn^cr find out even a

single ;.ven-.!e of e>vapt\ becaitse noUxly and riotlting will try to wehbine
\oa. The.ro'.Wc ihe only way to |>? alive is to » •iTender to the Kouran
vh-*i Ai iiv>'v 1 f surrciidtM, > 4)« will be able ip live here in i<5;k.c
TGvieving v,-;irnv protection and go back your sweet Iwme to see your
tmm dear, dear nvother and wife.
Don't bojome
at the gate of death. Dp tum::*4cr «s s#>ort aa
pccsible not hesitatingi
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Araerican Leaflet Disseminated in North Korea—Psychological
Warfare and Other Actions Resulted In Over 23,000 Communist

POW's Refusing Repatriation At The Cessation Of Hostilities
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APPENDIX 2 (Brainwashing: Related Terms)

Advertising

Mind Reform and Re-education

Brain-changing

Narcohypnosis

Brain-warfare

Persuasion

Coercive Persuasion

Public Relations

Corticovisceral Psychiatry

Psychological Artillery

Dialecticla Persuasion

Psychological Mass Coercion

Education

Psychological Mass Control

Ideological Reform

Psycho-surgery

Ideological Remoulding

Self-criticism

Indoctrination

Self-cultivation

Mass Hypnotism

Socialization

Mental Douche

Soul-surgery

Menticide

Though Reform

111

APPENDIX 3 (Map Showing Position Of Temporary And Permanent
POW Camps And The Position Of United Nations Forces
At Various Stages In The Korean War)
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Source: Biderman, March To Calumny, pp. 96, 202.
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APPENDIX 4 (Statistics Applicable To The Korean

POW Experience)
Table 1 (Numbers Who Died And Numbers Who Survived Among

U.S. Army Personnel Known Captured In Each Period
Of The Korean War)

Period

Number

Number

Captured

Captured

Died

Jun-Oct 1950

1,037

575

Nov 1950-Feb 1951

4,139

1,896

Mar-Jun 1951

975

165

Jul 1951-Apr 1952

234

15

May 1952-Mar 1953

130

9

Apr-Jul 1953

139

0

113

"Table 2 (Fate Of U.S. Array Personnel Captured In Korea)
Survivors:

Repatriated

3,326

Escaped, evaded, or released
at the front
Refused repatriation

647

20

TOTAL SURVIVORS

3,993

Died In Eneray Territory;

Died in authenticated atrocities

1,036

Died in POW caraps

2,634

Missing; evidence indicated

captured, but phesuraed dead

244*

Refused repatriation, dead in
eneray territory
TOTAL KNOWN OR PRESUMED DEAD

3,915

TOTAL KNOWN OR BELIEVED TO HAVE

BEEN IN ENEMY HAND

7,908

*This total does not include the 2,237 men who were listed
as missing in action at the end of 1953. Moreover, no
information exists to indicate that any of these raen were
captured.

1U

Table 3 (Number And Percent Of Repatriated Prisoners Of
War Of Each Service Suspected Of Misconduct Who
Required Further Investigation)

Number
Total

Service

Army

Repatriated

Percent

"Required

"Required

Further

Further

Investigation" Investigation"

3,973

426

11%

Air Force

224

87

39%

Marine Corps

200

52

26%

31

0

4,428

565

Navy

ALL SERVICES

13%

Source: Biderman, March To Calumny, Table 1-p. Ill;

Table 2-p. 94; Table 3-p. 30.
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APPENDIX 5 (Communist Techniques Of Interrogation Used
In Korea)

1.

DECEPTION—A common practice of the Communists was to

request the prisoner to prepare a TOE (Table Of Organiza
tion And Equipment) of his military organization as it
stood at the time of his capture. If he gave false infor
mation the interrogator would produce the correct answer
from the United States field manual.

The prisoner was then

given a long lecture on lying and warned that further
falsification would not be tolerated.

The enemy asked the

same question again and had the prisoner give the correct
answer. He was then told that the enemy had all the
correct answers and that he was asked such questions simply

to test his honesty. If the prisoner fell into this trap',
he was open for further interrogations and deceptions. On
the TOE question and many others the enemy did have the
correct answers; however, he did not have the correct
answers to all the questions he asked—if he had he would
not have needed to interrogate any prisoners. The
Communists continued by representing the whole interroga

tion operation as purely routine, indicating that the
prisoner's role in it was of no real importance. In truth,
no enemy will spend time on a useless interrogation, for he
has more fruitful uses for his personnel.

Another deception device the Communists favored was
having prisoners write essays on subjects which, on the
surface, appeared to have no military or propaganda

significance: American banking methods, industrial finance
and management, journalism, bridge building, and the like.
The captors would show prisoners publications bearing on
these subjects and give the impression that they already

had the information and merely wanted to get the prisoner's
views. Some of these essays and statements were read over
the Communist radio in the enemy propaganda attempt to
convince the world that the prisoners were against

"American aggression;" others were used to blackmail the
prisoners into further acts of collaboration—-the prisoners
who had prepared them were told that they would be exposed
to their fellow prisoners or to the American "authorities"
as collaborators. This, of course, was despite the fact
that prisoners were Induced to write essays and confessions
partly by the promise that all statements and confessions
would simply be filed away, with signatures deleted, for
future educational use.
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2T HARASSMENT-^-Perslstent and annoying harassment was a
effective technique of interrogation, especially when the

prisoners were not aware that the harassment was, in fact,
a technique.

A prisoner would be called to the interroga

tion room at odd hours of the day or night.

He would be

awakened from his sleep, or summoned during a meal. Some
times he would be dismissed only to be recalled a short
time later. Many prisoners became exasperated and came
to believe that if they simply talked or answered the
questions they were asked, the Communists would let them
alone. In fact, it never happened that way—NO prisoner

who ever gave any information was let alone. After giving
an answer the prisoner would be pressured to explain it and
give details. Bit by bit he was led deeper into collabora
tion.

3.

REPETITION—Although repetition is, in a sense,

harassment, the Communists considered it an independent
technique in its own right and used it as such. Going
over questions again and over their answers was wearing
and boring to the prisoner; but the interrogator would be
sympathetic, understanding, and tolerant. By going over
questions many times, the Communists were able to discover
whether the prisoner really had the sought-after informa
tion.

This technique often broke down stubbornness-

prisoners gave in and answered questions simply to escape
the exasperatingly patient questioning.
H.

THE "201 FILE"--The Communists prepared files on each

prisoner and kept them up to date for reference when he was
summoned for interrogation. The prisoner was shown a
folder with his name and service number written in English

and Chinese, and told that the Communists knew all about

him, about his background, his family and all other impor
tant aspects of his life. The results of the initial
interrogation at the collecting point, the many forms he
had completed, and the pieces of blank paper with his
signatures were all part of the file. In addition, the
file contained information taken from letters he had
received and from those he had written, many of which the

Comfflunists had never mailed, and it was often enlarged by
the addition of blank sheets of paper. Faced with this
material and hearing the claims that the enemy had much
more information about him, the prisoner was likely to wilt
and give the enemy additional information.
This is an old technique which has been used by

many agencies throughout the world. To resist it, the
prisoner must retain his confidence and recognize the trick
that his captors are attempting to put over on him. The
enemy relies heavily on a prisoner's not knowing what is
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happening to him in a detached situation such as capture.
The prisoner need only remember that if the enemy were
certain of all this information he would not be under

interrogation. The captor's prime goal is to get the
prisoner to talk in the knowledge that once started he
won't be able to stop. To thwart the attempt the prisoner
must keep his wits about him and his mouth shut.
5.

WALKING CONFERENCE—It was common for an enemy inter

rogator to approach a prisoner and invite him to go for a
walk outside the prison compound. To the prisoner this
request seemed harmless enough, and a walk was a welcome
relief from the monotony of the camp routine. During this
walk the interrogator usually engaged the prisoner in
informal and personal conversation. The prisoner forgot or
did not fully realize that interrogators are chosen—by the
Communists as well as by the American Army—chiefly for
their ability to elicit information. Most prisoners found
this technique difficult to resist.
6.

THE "MUTT AND JEFF" APPROACH-—A technique so old
that it is universally recognized by its nickname, the

"Mutt and Jeff" approach, which uses two interrogators.
The first acts ferocious and soon becomes enraged with the

prisoner, even to the point of slapping or kicking him.
If the prisoner is frightened into divulging information at
this point, the enemy has gained his goal with unexpected
ease. If not, another interrogator enters the room, often
acting as if he is superior in rank to the first. This
second man appears to become angry with his assistant and
may even strike him. Banishing him from the room--often
with threats of demotion or other punishment—the newly
arrived interrogator apologies to the prisoner. He says
that his assistant's behavior was crude, unsoldierly and
suited only to prisoners who are not intelligent. This

implies a bond between the POW and his questioner—they are
both intelligent, certainly more so than the crude assis
tant. Now the interrogator is free to turn on the friendly
appoarch, and the prisoner—often unaware of the trick—
lowers his defenses and starts to talk.

7.

BIOGRAPHICAL ESSAYS—A Communist technique related to

the essays and to the 201 file was to urge the prisoners to
write long, comprehensive biographies. These were to
include practically every aspect of their lives up to the
time of their capture, and they proved a most profitable
means of gathering a vast amount of information. Through
this device the Communists obtained information even their

most skilled interrogators could not have gotten. As a
rule the initial biography the prisoner prepared was
returned repeatedly for additional details; each time the
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prisoner added a little more information in the hope that
it would satisfy his captor. Of course, so long as he
continued to supply information the Communists persisted
in their demands for more.

From the enemy's veiwpoint these biographies were
very helpful. First, they enabled the Communists to
categorize the prisoner, permitting them to tailor their
indoctrination approach to him. Furthermore, the captive
often gave information about other prisoners, rendering
these others vulnerable to the designs of the captors.

The

enemy studied these documents very carefully, and often
called the prisoners back for clarification or amplifica
tion of the biographies.

Some prisoners wrote as many as

500 pages of material about themselves, their hobbies, and
occupations and everything else they could think of. And
each time the prisoner "clarified" some point, he gave more
information to the enemy. One American wrote a total of
nine personal biographies. The "clarifications" the enemy
requested eventually included comments favorable to the
enemy and to his system. Communism, enabling him to bring
a great deal of pressure to bear on the author.
8.

THREATS—Prisoners who prepared or signed personal

biographies or petitions made themselves targets for
coercive threats, for all such documents contained some
thing derogatory about our government or our army. When
the prisoner who had prepared such a document refused to

give more information, he was told that the documents he
had prepared or signed would be forwarded to the American
"authorities" for future legal action against him.

Although the enemy never did, take such action against an
American prisoner, most prisoners felt that the possibility
did exist.

Such threats caused many American prisoners to

comply with endless requests for additional information.
Many other prisoners held out against such threats and were
not harmed.

Other implied threats worked to the enemy's advan

tage. By the time the prisoners arrived at the permanent
prison camps they had heard a great number of atrocity
stories and experienced the hostile atmosphere of capture.
The Communists tried to make the FOW believe that anyone

who resisted was sent away to be shot or worked to death.

Many prisoners interviewed upon their repatriation from
North Korea gave reports of resisters they were certain had
been killed. Investigation showed that the "dead men" had
merely been transferred to another camp, while the other
prisoners concluded from their disappearance that they had
been "eliminated."
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9. SELF-INDUCED FEAR—-In some instances American prisoners
were so terrified by their own imaginings of what would

happen to them during interrogation that their captors
didn't even need to question them.

These men had

frightened themselves to the point that they poured out all
information they had the minute they were asked to speak.
Others, nearly as frightened, held out until the Communists
said that "it would be better" for the POW if he talked.

In their frightened state, these wretched men thought this
statement was a threat of all kinds of torture and unkown,
mysterious tragedies—-so they gave in.

Source: U.S. Army Intelligence Center And School,
Military Intelligence Subcourse 105: Examination
Of Prisoners Of War And Documents, Fort Huachuca,

Arizona, February 19b3 (Revised November 1974),
pp. 105;2;23-105;2;26.

120

17 Jan. 51

China gives "outrageous and unacceptable"
reply to U.S. cease-fire proposal.

20 Jan. 51

Chinese set up first permanent POW camp
near Pyoktong.

22 Jan. 51

India submits peace proposal to UN.

25 Jan. 51

Allies regain offensive; Asian-Arab group
submits Korean peace proposal.

1 Feb. 51

UN General Assembly labels Communist
China the aggressor.

12-18 Feb. 51

Mar. 51

Communist counter-offensive.

Chinese brainwashing program begins.

15 Mar. 51

Allies retake Seoul.

31 Mar. 51

UN crosses 38th parallel again.

11 Apr. 51

Truman removes MacArthur.

Jun. 51

Soviet Ambassador to the UN suggests truce
talks should begin in order to end
hostilities.

14 June 51

UN takes P'yongyang.

8 July 51

Truce talks begin.

5 Aug. 51

UN quits truce talks in protest against
propaganda violations.

11 Aug. 51

23 Aug. 51

Truce talks are resumed.

Communists break off truce talks; charging
air attacks on Kaesong.

25 Oct. 51

27 Nov. 51

Truce talks resume.

Agreement in truce talks on location of
cease-fire line.

12 Jan. 52

Mig 15's (Russian aircraft) attack U.S.
planes for first time.

Mar. 52

Brainwashing halts.
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4 Map. 52

28 Apr. 52

Secretary of State Acheson denies U.S.
used or is using BW on prisoners of war.

UN submits proposals on voluntary
repatriation of POW's to end truce
deadlock,

4 Sep. 52

Truce talks in sixth week of deadlock.

8 Oct. 52

Communists reject UN truce proposals;
negotiations postponed indefinately.

2 Dec. 52

President-Elect Eisenhower goes to Korea.

15 Dec. 52

Communists charges U.S. continues brain
washing POW's.

28 Mar. 53

Red China yields on POW repatriation;
accepts neutral custodian for prisoners
unwilling to go home.

20 Apr. 53

Operation Little Switch—149 sick and
wounded prisoners returned.

20 June 53

Communists discover that over 23,000
prisoners of the UN will refuse repatria

tion; 14,704 are Chinese.
27 July 53

Armistice is signed at Panmunjon.

3 Aug. 53

Operation Big Switch begins.

6 Sep. 53

Operation Big Switch is completed—3,629
American prisoners repatriated.

25 Jan. 54

Final deadline for choosing to go home

passes for POW's declining repatriation.
17 Aug. 55

Defense Department Report on POW's
released and "Code of Conduct"

promulgated.

Source: Bidermah, March To Calumny, pp. 283-285, plus
dates presented in this thesis.
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